Southeast Asia’s relations with Taiwan, 2000-2016: an assessment of Vietnam and Singapore by Yang, Tingting
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2017-09
Southeast Asias relations with Taiwan,
2000-2016: an assessment of Vietnam and Singapore
Yang, Tingting
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/56192
Copyright is reserved by the copyright owner.













Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
SOUTHEAST ASIA’S RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN, 









Thesis Advisor:  Michael Malley 
Second Reader:  Michael Glosny 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB  
No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork 
Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank) 
2. REPORT DATE   
September 2017 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
SOUTHEAST ASIA’S RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN, 2000–2016: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF VIETNAM AND SINGAPORE 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Tingting Yang 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER    
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING  AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
In Southeast Asia, a unique situation has existed for decades where political, economic, military and 
cultural relations flourish between Southeast Asian countries and Taiwan in the absence of official 
diplomatic relations. The Taiwanese economy is very important to Southeast Asia, yet Taiwan’s 
unresolved political unification with the People’s Republic of China is a threat to the security of Southeast 
Asia. In many ways, Taiwan is the elephant in the room; despite their importance, studies on Southeast 
Asia have largely neglected the existence and the durability of the ties between Southeast Asian countries 
and Taiwan. To find out what motivates Southeast Asia to maintain relations with Taiwan and vice versa, 
this thesis investigates the bilateral developments between Taiwan and Southeast Asia by conducting a 
comparative assessment of Vietnam and Singapore. The focus of the thesis is on the period between 2000 
and 2016, as there is scant research on Southeast Asia and Taiwan during the last sixteen years. The thesis 
examines key dimensions of the bilateral relationships and a number of hypotheses that are found in 
existing literature. The research found that the hypotheses only partially explain the reasons for changes in 
relations. For Vietnam and Singapore, economic interests and security concerns are the main reasons for 
engaging Taiwan. Based on the evidence gathered, this thesis also analyzes Vietnam and Singapore’s 
responses to the new Taiwanese President, Tsai Ing-wen. 
 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  
Southeast Asia, Singapore, Taiwan, China, Taiwan–Southeast Asia, Vietnam–Taiwan, 
Singapore–Taiwan, One-China 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
119 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii 




Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
 
 
SOUTHEAST ASIA’S RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN, 2000–2016: AN 




Civilian, Singapore Ministry of Defense 
B.A., National University of Singapore, 2008 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 






















Chair, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv 




In Southeast Asia, a unique situation has existed for decades where political, 
economic, military and cultural relations flourish between Southeast Asian countries and 
Taiwan in the absence of official diplomatic relations. The Taiwanese economy is very 
important to Southeast Asia, yet Taiwan’s unresolved political unification with the 
People’s Republic of China is a threat to the security of Southeast Asia. In many ways, 
Taiwan is the elephant in the room; despite their importance, studies on Southeast Asia 
have largely neglected the existence and the durability of the ties between Southeast 
Asian countries and Taiwan. To find out what motivates Southeast Asia to maintain 
relations with Taiwan and vice versa, this thesis investigates the bilateral developments 
between Taiwan and Southeast Asia by conducting a comparative assessment of Vietnam 
and Singapore. The focus of the thesis is on the period between 2000 and 2016, as there 
is scant research on Southeast Asia and Taiwan during the last sixteen years. The thesis 
examines key dimensions of the bilateral relationships and a number of hypotheses that 
are found in existing literature. The research found that the hypotheses only partially 
explain the reasons for changes in relations. For Vietnam and Singapore, economic 
interests and security concerns are the main reasons for engaging Taiwan. Based on the 
evidence gathered, this thesis also analyzes Vietnam and Singapore’s responses to the 
new Taiwanese President, Tsai Ing-wen. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
China has insisted on the “One-China policy” in its diplomatic interactions with 
all countries and bars any dual recognition of both China and Taiwan. The One-China 
policy acknowledges that there is only one government representing China, and that 
government is the People’s Republic of China on the mainland instead of the Republic of 
China on the island of Taiwan. This has resulted in Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation because 
significantly more countries recognize China over Taiwan. In response, Taiwan has tried 
extensively to cultivate ties with all countries to expand its regional and international 
space. Taiwan has tried especially hard to establish and maintain ties with Southeast 
Asian counties that are geographically close and with which it shares strong economic 
linkages. 
Although these Southeast Asia countries acknowledge the One-China policy and 
recognize only China, they continue to maintain non-diplomatic, informal relations with 
Taiwan, chiefly because Taiwanese investment is important to their economic 
development. Nonetheless, Taiwan’s relations with Southeast Asian countries have not 
been consistent. Taiwan–Southeast Asia relations were considered good during Taiwan 
president Lee Teng-hui’s terms (1988–2000) with robust economic ties and de facto 
diplomatic relations. Studies of the post-Lee period have described a state of deteriorated 
relations between Taiwan and Southeast Asian countries when Chen Shui-bian succeeded 
Lee (2000–2008) and improvements in relations when Ma Ying-jeou took office (2008–
2016). What accounts for these changes in Taiwan’s relations with these Southeast 
Asian countries?  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Despite not having diplomatic relations with Southeast Asian countries, Taiwan 
has nonetheless maintained informal ties with many of them. Over the last 16 years, there 
are signs that Taiwan–Southeast Asia relations have shifted in significant ways, but little 
has been written on this topic. Most of what has been published about Taiwan–Southeast 
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Asia has been written from Taiwan’s perspective, and Southeast Asia’s role in shaping its 
ties with Taiwan remains poorly understood. Taiwan is in all aspects a country, but it 
does not have the recognition of the world. Its economy is one of the biggest in Asia and 
well-plugged into regional trade and investment flows. However, Taiwan’s unresolved 
relationship with China has made the island an ever-present risk to the stability and 
security of Asia because China has not renounced the use of force to achieve 
reunification with Taiwan. It is therefore worthwhile to study how Taiwan uses its 
relations with Southeast Asian countries as a tool for survival and how the relations have 
changed over time. This thesis seeks to contribute to the literature on Taiwan–Southeast 
Asia relations from a Southeast Asia perspective.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review organizes existing studies on Taiwan–Southeast Asia 
relations into three sections. The first section examines scholars’ views on the state of 
Taiwan–Southeast Asia relations in the last three decades. The second section looks at the 
key explanations for the changes in relations. The third section looks at the gaps in the 
existing literature. 
1. Examining the State of Taiwan–Southeast Asia Relations in the Last 
Three Decades 
Scholars generally agree that when Lee Teng-hui was president from 1988 to 
2000, relations between Taiwan and Southeast Asia were generally good, except for the 
periods when China threatened Taiwan with military force. Taiwan was an economic 
miracle after undergoing rapid industrialization from the 1950s to 1980s and used its 
economic prowess as a basis to engage Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian countries, which 
for the most part are economically poorer than Taiwan, responded to favorable 
Taiwanese economic deals with quasi-diplomatic concessions such as allowing 
Taiwanese officials to visit the country, giving diplomatic courtesies to these officials, 
and upgrading the names of Taiwan’s embassies in the country.1 According to Chen Jie, 
                                                 
1 Chen Jie, “Taiwan’s Diplomacy in Southeast Asia: Still Going-South?” in China and Southeast Asia: 
Global Changes and Regional Challenges, eds. Ho Khai Leong and Samuel C. Y. Ku (Singapore: ISEAS–
Yusof Ishak Institute, 2005), 241. 
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during Lee’s term, Taiwanese leaders travelled widely in Southeast Asia, including Lee 
Teng-hui’s visit to Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand in 1989 and 1994; 
Premier Lien Chan’s visit in 1998 to Malaysia and Singapore; and Premier Vincent 
Siew’s visit to Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia in the same year (1998).2 As a 
result of Lee Teng-hui’s efforts in pushing for name changes, Taiwan’s embassies were 
upgraded from vague-sounding names like “Chinese Chamber of Commerce” and “Far 
East Trade Office” to “Taipei Economic and Trade Office” and “Taipei Economic and 
Cultural Office.”3 Taiwan also used the Overseas Economic Cooperation Development 
Fund, also known as the International Economic Cooperation Development Fund, to 
provide both financial and technical assistance to developing Southeast Asian countries, 
which were welcomed by the recipients.4 
Relations between Taiwan and Southeast Asia generally deteriorated when 
opposition politician Chen Shui-bian took office in 2000. Over the course of his term, 
Chen Shui-bian took on an increasingly antagonistic stance toward China and tried to 
promote Taiwan’s independence from mainland China. According to Chen’s study of the 
Republic of China Foreign Policy Yearbook, Taipei’s “politico-diplomatic profile has 
stagnated, if not deteriorated.”5 Chen also notes that the number of visits between Taipei 
and Southeast Asian officials has declined. Chen Shui-bian conducted what has been 
called “scorched-earth diplomacy,” a tactic to “light so many diplomatic fires that Beijing 
would be deprived of the resources needed to harass Taiwan at regional forums.”6 Chen 
Shui-bian and his deputy Annette Lu, in their first diplomatic offensive, tried to visit 
Indonesia under the pretext of taking a vacation but failed badly when Indonesia refused 
Lu entry into Jakarta. Southeast Asian countries resented being used by Taiwan as an 
arsenal against Beijing. After the failed visit by Chen Shui-bian in December 2002, 
                                                 
2 Ibid., 239. 
3 Jing Bo-jiun, “Taiwan and Southeast Asia: Opportunities and Constraints of Continued 
Engagement,” Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, no. 2 (2016): 26. 
4 Ho Khai Leong, “The Changing Political Economy of Taiwan–Southeast Asia Relations,” Pacific 
Review 6, no. 1 (1993): 34. 
5 Chen, “Taiwan’s Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,” 249. 
6 Jing, “Taiwan and Southeast Asia,” 26. 
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Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman Marty Natalegawa commented, “We have 
learned from the past that Taiwanese leaders often take political advantage of their 
private visits to Indonesia’s tourist resorts” and “Chen Shui-bian is not welcomed here.”7 
The Philippine government “categorically refused to accept any possible visit by Chen 
[Shui-bian] regardless of his visiting capacity.”8 In 2004, Singapore leaders explicitly 
criticized pro-independence sentiments held by some Taiwanese. The Taiwanese 
government and the public reacted angrily to Singapore Foreign Minister George Yeo’s 
statement to the United Nations General Assembly. Following this incident, Singapore–
Taiwan relations plummeted. This will be further discussed in Chapter III.  
Ma Ying-jeou’s efforts to improve relations with China (hereafter called cross-
Strait relations) were welcomed by Southeast Asian countries and contributed to the 
improvement of Taiwan–Southeast Asia relations. Southeast Asian leaders made it 
known that they welcomed positive cross-Strait relations by issuing a communique at the 
41st Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting in 2008: “We welcomed 
the positive development in relations across the Taiwan Strait. We expressed our hope 
that cross-Strait relations would continue to improve.”9 According to Jing Bo-jiun, 
“Taiwanese diplomats in Southeast Asia appeared to have had greater access to high-
ranking officials in the region after Ma took office.”10 As for bilateral visits, Ma Ying-
jeou travelled to Singapore twice, once to pay his respects to the late Lee Kuan Yew after 
Lee passed away in March 2015 and a second trip to Singapore in November 2015 to 
meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping in what has been called a “historic meeting.” 
This was followed by a meeting with Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. There 
were also several high-level exchanges between Taiwanese and Southeast Asian officials, 
including the visits of Philippines Secretary of Finance, Indonesian Minister of 
Manpower and Transmigration, and Thai Minister of Labor to Taiwan.11 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 27. 
8 Chen, “Taiwan’s Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,” 250. 
9 Ibid., 36. 
10 Ibid., 37. 
11 Jing, “Taiwan and Southeast Asia,” 42. 
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a. Key Explanations for the Changes in Taiwan–Southeast Asia Relations 
In the academic works surveyed, two themes/explanations that contribute to the 
improvement or deterioration of Taiwan–Southeast Asia relations were identified, 
namely, state of cross-Strait relations and changes in economic conditions. 
(1) Cross-Strait Relations  
Because Southeast Asian countries have adopted the One-China policy and have 
diplomatic relations with China but not Taiwan, maintaining good formal relations with 
Beijing trumps maintaining relations with Taiwan. Besides diplomatic ties with China, 
Southeast Asian countries see tense cross-Strait relations as a security risk to the region 
and have consistently called for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Chen states that 
the evolution of cross-Strait relations influences regional governments’ approaches to 
Taipei whereby an “improved atmosphere across the Taiwan Strait would make things 
easier for Southeast Asian governments” when dealing with Taiwan.12 When cross-Strait 
relations turn sour, as they did during from 1995 to 1996, “no ASEAN country wants to 
be seen to be siding with Taipei.”13 In fact, tense cross-Strait relations forced Southeast 
Asian countries to side with China. ASEAN countries publicly urged Taiwan “not to 
provoke mainland China by challenging the P.R.C.’s ‘One China’ principle.”14 In 1999 
when Lee Teng-hui insisted that cross-Strait relations were special “state-to-state” ones, 
China ceased cross-Strait consultations. ASEAN countries reacted to the rise in tensions 
by jointly issuing a declaration that said, “We expressed our concern over the tension that 
arose in the Taiwan Strait after 9 July 1999, which could seriously affect regional peace 
and stability and prospects for economy recovery [after the Asian Financial Crisis in 
1997]. We hoped for a quick and peaceful return to normalcy. We reaffirmed our 
commitment to our One China Policy.”15 
                                                 
12 Chen Jie, Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan: Pragmatic Diplomacy in Southeast Asia (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2002), 85. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Jing, “Taiwan and Southeast Asia,” 19. 
15 Ibid., 20. 
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The state of cross-Strait relations also affects Taiwan–Southeast Asia relations 
because China tends to put more pressure on Southeast Asian countries when China–
Taiwan relations are going badly. China’s goal is to prevent Taiwan from achieving de 
jure independence, so Beijing has directly intervened to block any attempts by Taiwan to 
expand its regional and international space, especially when the Taiwanese president is 
inclined toward independence. China is a traditional hegemon and a rising power 
(economically and militarily) and has more political clout than Taiwan.16 Chinese leaders 
have spoken out several times to criticize Southeast Asian countries when they take 
actions such as visiting Taiwan because these actions encourage Taiwanese 
“separateness” or independence.  
In 1996, China attempted to prevent Taiwan from joining the ASEAN Regional 
Forum by proposing a new rule that requires admission of new members be approved by 
all existing ones. China succeeded in blocking Taiwanese participation by arguing that 
Taiwan was not a sovereign state, and hence it could not join the forum as it could not 
join the United Nations.17 Despite repeatedly expressing interest, Philippine President 
Benigno S. Aquino was not able to go to Taiwan in 1993 to receive an honorary doctoral 
degree from Fu Jen Catholic University because China warned him not to go.18 In 2004, 
China heavily criticized Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s visit to Taiwan 
after Lee went ahead with the trip despite China’s request for him to abort it. According 
to Jing, the Taiwan visit resulted in a cancellation of the Governor of the People’s Bank 
of China’s trip to Singapore and a suspension of bilateral free trade agreement 
negotiations.19  
(2) Changes in Economic Conditions 
Many of the studies on Taiwan–Southeast Asia relations are focused on the 
political economy between Taiwan and Southeast Asia. Chen asserts, “Taiwan’s 
                                                 
16 Samuel C. Y. Ku, “Southeast Asia and Cross-Strait Relations: The Policy of Separation of Politics 
and Economics,” Journal of Contemporary China 7, no. 19 (1998): 424. 
17 Jing, “Taiwan and Southeast Asia,” 18. 
18 Chen, Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan, 89. 
19 Jing, “Taiwan and Southeast Asia,” 32. 
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agreements with the ASEAN countries are almost all about economic and trade issues.”20 
Chen also explains that ASEAN countries would not have upgraded the level of bilateral 
diplomatic representations without economic benefits from Taiwan; in fact, “ups and 
downs in politico-diplomatic relations closely coincided with the ups and downs in 
Taiwan’s perceived economic value as well as the changing China factor in regional 
politics” (emphasis added).21 Because Taiwan is economically and technologically more 
developed than most of the Southeast Asian countries, it can use its economic profile to 
provide investments, import migrant workers from Southeast Asia, and offer 
development assistance.22 For Taiwan, its capital and technical expertise complemented 
Southeast Asia’s natural resources and abundant labor.  
Taiwan has been investing in Southeast Asia since 1959, but the most significant 
expansion of Taiwan’s outbound investment began in 1987.23 Comparing its investment 
into Southeast Asia from the late 1950s, Chen found that Taiwan’s investment in select 
countries was much higher in the late 1980s than in previous periods. Taiwan’s 
investment in Thailand in 1988 was nearly as much as the total sum Taiwan had invested 
from 1959 to 1987. A year later in 1989, Taiwan became the largest foreign investor in 
Malaysia and the Philippines. Because Taiwanese companies based in Southeast Asia 
induced trade flow between their home country and Southeast Asian countries, by the 
1990s Taiwan had become one of the top trading partners for many in the region.24 
Taiwanese investors in Southeast Asia also employed scores of local workers because of 
the labor-intensive nature of their projects.25 
In 1993, Lee Teng-hui launched the “Go South” policy to provide all kinds of 
assistance to Taiwanese enterprises to invest even more in Southeast Asia. Although total 
investment into Southeast Asia has expanded since the launch, by the end of the 1990s, 
                                                 
20 Chen, Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan, 101. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 




Taiwan was no longer one of the top two investors in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, or 
the Philippines. One reason for the drop in ranking was because Taiwanese capital had 
been increasingly diverted to China. 
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis saw Taiwan initiate a number of assistance 
packages and proposals to help its affected Southeast Asian neighbors. These included 
encouraging Taiwanese investors to go into the region—even when other foreign 
investors were pulling out—and injecting U.S. dollars into state banks to ease monetary 
flow in the countries.26 However, what Taiwan could offer was not comparable to China. 
By keeping its currency stable instead of devaluing it to make its exports competitive 
against now cheaper ASEAN exports, China helped ASEAN countries recover quickly 
from the crisis by continuing their export-led growth trajectory.27 China also extended 
loans to Southeast Asian countries. Since the late 1990s, Taiwan’s trade with Southeast 
Asia did not grow as much as the 1980s and 1990s, and despite attempts by the 
Taiwanese government to get its enterprises to invest in Southeast Asia, Taiwanese 
investment declined greatly.28 In 1998, Taiwan's total investment in Southeast Asia 
amounted to $1.4 billion compared to $4.8 billion in 1997.29 In contrast, China’s trade 
with Southeast Asia grew in absolute volume and share. In 1996, China’s trade with 
Southeast Asia reached $19 billion (USD), nearing the Taiwan–ASEAN trade figure of 
$26 billion.30 Since then, China has overtaken Taiwan in trading volume: China–ASEAN 
trade in 2016 was $346 billion, and Taiwan–ASEAN trade was $94 billion.31 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 109. 
27 Samuel C. Y. Ku, “The Changing Political Economy of Taiwan’s and China’s Relations with 
Southeast Asia: A Comparative Perspective,” in China and Southeast Asia: Global Changes and Regional 
Challenges, eds. Ho Khai Leong and Samuel C. Y. Ku (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, 
2005), 268. 
28 Ibid., 267–269. 
29 Ibid., 269. 
30 Ku, “The Changing Political Economy,” 270; and “Trade Statistics,” Bureau of Foreign Trade, 
Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs, accessed September 14, 2017, http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/FSCE030F/ 
FSCE030F. The U.S. Dollar is used throughout the thesis. Non-U.S. Dollar currency will be distinguished 
accordingly. 
31 “Top Ten ASEAN Trade Partner Countries/Regions, 2015,” Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations, accessed March 25, 2017, http://asean.org/storage/2015/12/table20_as-of-10-June-2016.pdf. 
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Trade and investment do not convey the full picture. Employment of migrant 
workers and tourism also contribute to the political economy between Taiwan–Southeast 
Asia and China–Southeast Asia. Although Taiwan has been a major employer of 
Southeast Asian migrant workers, other countries in the region, such as Singapore, also 
exhibit this aspect of relations with China. Singapore has faced a labor shortage and has 
been importing massive numbers of Chinese migrant workers to help supplement its 
workforce. In terms of tourism, the arrival of Chinese tourists into ASEAN has dwarfed 
all other sources.32 
2. Gaps in Existing Literature 
A main observation from the review of existing literature is the lack of hierarchy 
between the key explanations provided in the previous section. When Lee Teng-hui was 
President of Taiwan, cross-Strait relations were not all rosy; in fact, Lee’s emphasis on 
special “state-to-state” relations had angered China so much that relations deteriorated 
significantly. Why were Southeast Asian countries still relatively friendly to Taiwan 
during Lee Teng-hui’s presidency, compared to Chen Shui-bian’s period when cross-
Strait relations were badly affected, this time by his emphasis on Taiwan’s 
independence? This thesis examines the various reasons behind the changes to determine 
which reason is the most significant. 
The literature on Taiwan–Southeast Asia relations during the presidencies of 
Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008) and Ma Ying-jeou (2008–2016) is much more limited 
compared to the works on Lee Teng-hui’s term; this author could only locate a handful of 
academic writings that focus in some detail on this topic, and the writings are from the 
Taiwanese perspective. This author found very few writings on this topic from a 
Southeast Asian perspective. Furthermore, the existing studies do not focus on broad 
shifts in relations between Taiwan and Southeast Asia.  
                                                 
32 “Top Ten Country/Regional Sources of Visitors to ASEAN as of 30 September 2015,” Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations, accessed March 25, 2017, 
http://www.asean.org/storage/2015/11/tourism/Table_30.pdf. 
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D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis examines two key explanations that scholars have offered to explain 
the changes in Taiwan–Southeast Asia relations. It also proposes another hypothesis that 
has not surfaced explicitly in existing academic works.  
Hypothesis One: Cross-Strait relations are among the main factors contributing to 
the changes in Taiwan–Southeast Asia relations. This hypothesis proposes that the state 
of China–Taiwan relations has a mirror effect on the state of Taiwan–Southeast Asia 
relations. When cross-Strait relations are bad and China increases its assertiveness over 
the Taiwan issue, relations between Southeast Asia and Taiwan stagnate or decline. 
Conversely, when cross-Strait relations are stable and China relaxes its pressure over the 
Taiwan issue, relations between Southeast Asia and Taiwan progress. 
Hypothesis Two: The change in importance of Taiwan’s economy vis-à-vis 
China’s is one of the main factors that has contributed to the changes in Taiwan–
Southeast Asia relations. This hypothesis proposes that when Taiwan’s economic value to 
Southeast Asia is greater than China’s, relations between Southeast Asia and Taiwan 
progress. Conversely, when Taiwan’s economic value to Southeast Asia is less than 
China’s, relations between Southeast Asia and Taiwan stagnate or deteriorate.  
Hypothesis Three: The way that Southeast Asian countries perceive China is one 
of the main factors that has contributed to the changes in Taiwan–Southeast Asia 
relations. This hypothesis proposes that when Southeast Asia countries view China 
negatively, they tend to take balancing actions against it. One of the ways that they 
balance against China is to forge better relations with Taiwan. Conversely, when 
Southeast Asia countries view China positively, they tend to ignore Taiwan to court 
closer relations with China. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN  
This thesis investigates the hypotheses by comparing bilateral relations between 
Taiwan and two Southeast Asian countries— Singapore and Vietnam during the 
presidencies of Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008) and Ma Ying-jeou (2008-2016) respectively. 
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The choice of these two countries is meant to test the hypotheses across two 
vastly different Southeast Asian countries with different socio-economic profiles and 
historical circumstances. The choice of Vietnam covers a mainland Southeast Asian 
country that has historically been closer to China. Singapore is a maritime Southeast 
Asian country that has historically been friendly to Taiwan. Both countries also have 
significant trading and investment relations with Taiwan. 
Besides relying on academic works, this thesis also makes use of official 
statements from governments as well as newspaper articles. The table below summarizes 
the indicators that are investigated to arrive at a conclusion of whether Vietnam–Taiwan 
and Singapore–Taiwan relations were good or otherwise. This thesis also attempts to look 
at the reactions of the two countries toward new Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen’s revived 
Go South policy. It is noteworthy that Tsai has not affirmed the “1992 Consensus” 
between China and Taiwan.  
 Indicators to Assess Bilateral Relations between Taiwan Table 1.  
and Southeast Asia 
SEA countries 
(n) 
Presidency of Chen 
Shui-bian (2000–2008) 
Presidency of Ma Ying-jeou 
(2008–2016) 




1. What was the state of bilateral relations between 




2. Were there any political incidents between country 
n and Taiwan? 
a. Chinese pressure on interaction between 
country n and Taiwan officials 
b. Stalling or cancellation of bilateral projects or 
agreements by the Chinese 
3. What other factors affected relations between 
country n and Taiwan, if any? 
a. How did country n view China? Did it view 
China positively or negatively?  
b. South China Sea 
c. Taiwan’s policy regarding independence 
1. What is the state of cross-
Strait relations? 
2. What is the reaction of 
country n toward Tsai’s 





F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This thesis is organized into four chapters. The second chapter looks at Vietnam–
Taiwan relations during the periods of Chen Shui-bian’s administration (2000–2008) and 
Ma Ying-jeou's administration (2008–2016). The third chapter looks at bilateral relations 
between Singapore and Taiwan over the two administrations. The fourth and final chapter 
analyzes the data presented in Chapters II and III and assesses the validity of the 
hypotheses. It also assesses the implications of those findings for the development of 
Taiwan's relations with Singapore and Vietnam in light of Tsai's position on cross-Strait 




This chapter analyzes Vietnam’s political and economic interactions with Taiwan 
from 2000 to 2016 to investigate the conventional wisdom that Vietnam’s relations with 
Taiwan deteriorated during Chen Shui-bian’s presidency (2000–2008) and improved 
during Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency (2008–2016) because of the decline of Taiwan’s 
economy relative to China as well as Chinese pressure on Southeast Asian countries with 
regard to conducting relations with Taiwan. 
This chapter finds that while Vietnam tried to accommodate China’s expectations 
to limit its interactions with Taiwan when Chen Shui-bian was president, Vietnam also 
tried to balance that approach with its enduring interest to do business with Taiwan and to 
maintain an independent foreign policy. Although there were some political incidents 
between Vietnam and Taiwan due to Chinese pressure on Vietnam, these incidents did 
not affect economic ties. After Ma Ying-jeou took over the presidency, Vietnam 
continued to maintain good economic ties with Taiwan, and Vietnam did not have to 
limit its engagement with Taiwan because of pressure from China. However, competing 
Vietnamese and Taiwanese claims over South China Sea features resulted in weaker 
engagement between the two countries, even as Vietnam developed a perception of China 
as a threat over the last decade. 
Relations between Vietnam and Taiwan are predominantly economic in nature, 
and political developments ultimately affect Taiwanese investment in Vietnam. The first 
section of this chapter examines Vietnam’s relations with Taiwan during the two 
administrations of Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou, focusing on political developments 
that took place as a result of China’s pressure. The second section looks at trade, 
investment, and labor relations to understand the robustness of Vietnam’s and Taiwan’s 
economic ties and whether these were affected by the growing importance of China’s 
economy. The third section examines the South China Sea disputes among Vietnam, 
China, and Taiwan to gain an understanding of how Vietnam may have developed a 
critical perception of China and whether it has sought closer relations with Taiwan to 
balance China.  
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A. POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN VIETNAM AND TAIWAN 
Vietnam’s relations with Taiwan were defined by economic cooperation in the 
1990s.33 Vietnam was keen on reaping economic benefits in the form of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), foreign markets, capital imports, and developmental assistance from 
Taiwan while Taiwan hoped to use its economic diplomacy to gain political concessions 
such as support for its entry into international organizations.34 In the 1990s, Taiwan’s 
trade with Vietnam grew substantially after Taiwan lifted trade sanctions from Vietnam 
in 1986.35 In 1995, total trade between Vietnam and Taiwan stood at $1.2 billion.36 
Taiwan was the largest foreign investor in Vietnam from 1987 to 1995, and Vietnam 
received 43 percent of all Taiwanese FDI going into ASEAN.37 Although Vietnam 
recognized only the People’s Republic of China politically, there was some progress 
made when Taiwan set up its de facto embassy in Ho Chi Minh City in 1992, and 
Vietnam set up its own representative office in Taipei in 1993. 
Vietnam continued to engage Taiwan economically from 2000 to 2016 and with 
economic ties come political interactions as well. Throughout this period, Vietnam 
consistently maintained its commitment to the One-China policy through issuing public 
statements, some jointly with China. However, away from the public glare, Vietnam kept 
up official visits to Taiwan and received Taiwanese officials in return. Interestingly, there 
were more visits between Vietnam and Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian's administration 
than there were during Ma Ying-jeou's. The likely reasons for this phenomenon are one, 
Chen Shui-bian's government had aggressively courted the Vietnamese from 2000 to 
2008 and two, during Ma Ying-jeou's terms, disputes over the South China Sea prevented 
the proliferation of visits. 
                                                 
33 See Zachary Abuza, “Vietnam-Taiwan Relations: Convergence and Divergence,” in Issues and 
Studies 32, no. 7 (1996): 109–128. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 112. 
36 Ibid., 114. 
37 Ibid. 
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1. Chen Shui-bian’s Term as President (2000–2008)  
In the 2000s, during Chen Shui-bian’s presidency, the Vietnamese government 
publicly signalled that Vietnam was not going to pursue diplomatic engagement with 
Taiwan while trying to maintain its ties at the same time. This section examines 
Vietnam’s public statements as well as official visits made by Vietnamese officials to 
Taiwan and vice versa to show that Vietnam was trying to maintain a balancing act 
between China and Taiwan. Despite tense cross-Strait relations resulting in increased 
Chinese pressure on Vietnam, Vietnam’s reaction was mostly limited to accommodating 
China’s interests in preventing Taiwan’s independence. Vietnam did not take issue with 
the Taiwanese government’s policy of pursuing independence, and there was no major 
negative fallout. 
Vietnam issued various public statements on its commitment to the One-China 
policy and opposition to Taiwan’s independence throughout Chen Shui-bian’s 
administration. Many of these statements were made when Vietnamese leaders met 
Chinese leaders and were clearly publicized to signal Vietnam’s deference to China over 
the Taiwan issue. In 2001, Nong Duc Manh, secretary general of the Vietnamese 
Communist Party, visited China and a joint communique was issued. The communique 
stated that Vietnam only conducts “non-official trade” with Taiwan, and there were no 
official bilateral relations between the two countries. While Taiwan was not a new issue 
between China and Vietnam in 2001, Taiwan took on added significance after Chen Shui-
bian and his pro-independence Democratic People’s Party (DPP) took power in 2000.38 
China became more concerned about ties between its diplomatic allies and Taiwan, 
especially when Taiwan was increasing its economic presence in many countries, 
including Vietnam.39 Table 2 shows some of the public statements that Vietnam made 
regarding the One-China policy and Taiwan independence. For a longer listing, see 
Appendix A. 
                                                 
38 Danny Wong Tze Ken, “A Fine Balancing Act; Vietnam Negotiating between China and Taiwan,” 
in Ensuring Interests: Dynamics of China–Taiwan Relations and Southeast Asia, eds. Ho Khai Leong and 
Hou Kok Chung (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya, 2006) 263–264.  
39 Ibid. 
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 Vietnam’s Public Affirmation of the One-China Policy and Table 2.  
Opposition to Taiwanese Independence 2000–2008 
Date Subject Verbatim Extract Source 
December 
2001 
Vietnam and China 





Nong Duc Manh 
visited China. 
“Vietnam reiterated that Vietnam 
recognizes the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China as the 
sole rightful Government for China, 
and that Taiwan is an inseparable 
territory of China. Vietnam only 
conducts non-official trade with 
Taiwan and does not develop 









Vietnam and China 
issue a joint 
communique after 
Chinese President Hu 
Jintao visited 
Vietnam and met 
Community Party of 
Vietnam General 
Secretary Nong Duc 
Manh, President Tran 
Duc Luong, Prime 
Minister Phan Van 
Khai, and Chairman 
of the National 
Assembly Nguyen 
Van An. 
“Vietnam affirmed that it would 
‘pursue a policy of one China, 
support China’s great unification 
cause, and resolutely oppose actions 
to split ‘independent Taiwan’ in any 
form, fully understand and back the 
National People’s Congress of 
China’s ratification of the ‘Anti-
Secession Law,’ welcome the 
detente trend in the relations of the 
mainland China and Taiwan in 
recent years. Vietnam does not 
develop any official relationship 
with Taiwan. The Chinese side 








Vietnam reaffirms its 
stance on the One 
China policy. 
“The Vietnamese Government 
affirmed its firm stance on the ‘one-
China’ policy as Foreign Ministry 
spokesman Le Dung commented on 
Taiwan’s push for a referendum on 








                                                 
40 Ibid., 262. 
41 “Vietnam, China Issue Joint Communique on Hu Jintao’s Visit,” Vietnam News Agency, November 
3, 2005. 
42 “Vietnam Restates Stance on ‘One-China’ Policy,” Vietnam News Agency, July 9, 2007. 
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At times, Vietnam also accommodated China’s interests by acceding to China’s 
demands for limiting the presence of Taiwanese officials at international events. In 
October 2005, Taipei and Kaohsiung City delegates were prevented from attending the 
opening and closing ceremonies of the Citynet Congress.43 Next, Vietnam blocked a 
Taiwanese business delegation from participating in the East Asia Conference on 
Competition Law and Policy in May 2007. This prompted Taiwan to announce that it 
would end Taiwanese technical aid for Vietnam.44 Then in August 2007, Vietnam 
cancelled a tourist visa for DPP Chairman Yu Shyi-kun shortly after it was issued, which 
was purportedly done at the behest of China.45 This issue prompted the DPP to petition 
the Taiwanese cabinet to “review investment, labour importation and trade ties” with 
Vietnam; however, economic ties were not greatly affected, as described in Section B of 
this chapter. 
Vietnam did not give in to all of China’s demands for severing links with Taiwan. 
In 2006, Vietnam resisted China and invited Taiwan to the Asia–Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC), one of the most important forums for Taiwan as it had been barred 
from most international organizations and only held diplomatic relations with 21 
countries. This incident resulted in China withholding its aid to Vietnam in 2007. 
Vietnam did, however, exclude the Taiwanese delegation from a breakfast meeting on 
November 16, 2006.46 
Vietnam quietly continued its engagement of Taiwan by receiving high-level 
Taiwanese officials as well as sending its own officials to Taiwan. Table 3 shows the 
high-level visits by Vietnamese and Taiwanese officials from 1999 to 2015, compiled 
from volumes of Taiwan’s Foreign Policy Yearbook. The majority of visits were made by 
Taiwanese officials with economic portfolios to Vietnam. The visits were likely made to 
                                                 
43 “Examples of China’s Suppression of Taiwan in the International Arena over Recent Years,” 
Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, November 1, 2007. 
44 “Hanoi Faces Taipei Wrath after Caving in to Beijing - Taiwan Cuts off Technical Aid after 
Delegation’s Visit to Vietnam Is Scrapped,” Straits Times, May 10, 2007. 
45 “Taiwan DPP Urges Reviewing Ties with Thailand, Vietnam after Visa Denials,” Taiwan News, 
August 16, 2007. 
46 “Taiwan Delegation Protests against Exclusion from APEC Breakfast Meeting,” Taiwan Central 
News Agency, November 16, 2006. 
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promote Chen Shui-bian’s revival of the “Southward policy,” known also as the Go 
South policy, first launched by Lee Teng-hui to create more economic opportunities for 
Taiwan businesses in Southeast Asia.47  
Bilateral cooperation also continued to take place in the 2000s. In 2004, Vietnam 
and Taiwan agreed to carry out marine research in coastal waters, and Taiwan offered to 
let Vietnamese researchers work at a marine center on the Pratas Islands in the South 
China Sea.48  
 Notable Visits by Vietnamese and Taiwanese Officials Table 3.  
from 1999 to 201549 
Visitor  Position Year 
Lan Van Gu (VN) Director of Prime Minister’s Office 1999 
Vincent Siew  (TW) President of the Executive Yuan 2000 
Ting Mao Shih  (TW) Secretary-General of Presidential Office 2000 
Rao Yingqi (TW) President of Executive Yuan 2000 
Lin Hsih-I (TW) Minister of Economic Affairs 2001 
Pham Quang 
Tuyen  
(VN) Vice Minister of Transport 2001 
Chiang Pin-kung (TW) Vice President of Executive Yuan 2002 
Steve Chen (TW) Minister of Economic Affairs 2006 
Ho Chih-chin (TW) Minister of Finance 2006 
Chang Sheng-
ford 
(TW) Minister of Finance  2013 
 
  
                                                 
47 “‘Go South’ Strategy Threatened,” Taipei Times, September 29, 2004. 
48 “Taiwan, Vietnam Boost Research Ties,” Taipei Times, December 15, 2004. 
49 Adapted from author’s own compilation from various issues of the Republic of China Foreign 
Policy Yearbook (1997–2015). Missing years indicate no data or no notable visits. There are no data for the 
period before 1997. 
 19 
2. Ma Ying-jeou’s Term as President (2008–2016) 
Vietnam continued to issue public statements on its commitment to the One-
China policy after Ma Ying-jeou was elected as the president of Taiwan in March 2008. 
Similar to its strategy when Chen Shui-bian was the president, Vietnam also attempted to 
maintain economic ties to Taiwan. The Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs first 
responded to the election of Ma Ying-jeou in March 2008 by stating that “Vietnam 
consistently pursues the ‘one China’ policy; Taiwan is an inseparable part of China. The 
Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legitimate government 
representing all China.”50 Subsequently, Vietnam continued to express its One-China 
policy in official statements, as shown in Table 4. As in 2000–2008, Vietnam usually 
issued these statements after meetings between Vietnamese and Chinese leaders. These 
statements reflected Vietnam’s continued deference to China on Taiwan’s status. 
  
                                                 
50 “Taiwan Is an Inseparable Part of China,” Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008. 
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 Vietnam’s Public Affirmation of the One-China Policy 2008–2016 Table 4.  
Date Subject Verbatim Extract Source 
March 2008 
In response to 
questions on the 
election of Ma Ying-
jeou, Vietnam stated 
that it is committed to 
the One China policy. 
“Vietnam consistently pursues the 
‘one China’ policy; Taiwan is an 
inseparable part of China. The 
Government of the People’s 
Republic of China is the sole 
legitimate government representing 
all China. Vietnam always supports 
China’s great cause of national 
unification and welcomes efforts to 
improve the cross-strait relations, 
thus contributing to the maintenance 









Vietnam and China 
on June 1 released a 
joint statement after 
General Secretary of 
the Communist Party 
of Vietnam Central 
Committee Nong Duc 
Manh visited China 
from May 30 to June 
2. 
“The Vietnamese side affirmed its 
consistent one-China policy and its 
support for the major cause of China 
unification and resolutely rejected 
activities targeting an independent 
Taiwan in any form; Vietnam has 
never developed and will not 
develop any official relations with 
Taiwan. The Chinese side 









Vietnam and China 
issued a joint 
statement after 
Chinese Premier Li 
Keqiang visited 
Vietnam from 
October 13–15, 2013. 
“The Vietnamese side affirmed to 
consistently pursue a one-China 
policy, support the peaceful 
development of cross-Taiwan Strait 
relations and China’s great cause of 
unification, and resolutely oppose 
actions for the ‘independent 
Taiwan’ in any form. Viet Nam 
does not develop any official ties 
with Taiwan. Viet Nam’s stance 









                                                 
51 Ibid. 
52 “Vietnam, China Issue Joint Statement,” Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 9, 2008. 
53 “VN, China issue joint statement,” Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 18, 2013. 
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Although observers generally speak of improved relations between Southeast 
Asian countries and Taiwan after Ma Ying-jeou became president, in the case of Vietnam 
there is little information to show that this happened. There were little political incidents 
documented between Vietnam and Taiwan, which reflects that Vietnam was relatively 
free of pressure from China to limit its engagement of Taiwan. However, there was only 
one official visit from 2008 to 2016 between the two countries, which was made by 
Taiwanese Minister of Finance Chang Sheng-ford in 2013. The lack of ministerial visits 
during Ma Ying-jeou’s administration, compared to Chen Shui-bian’s administration, is 
puzzling and does not corroborate conventional wisdom that there was an uptick in 
relations. Although improved cross-Strait relations gave rise to a conducive political 
climate for Vietnam and Taiwan to improve political relations, Ma Ying-jeou and his 
government’s assertions of Taiwan’s South China Sea claims were a barrier to bilateral 
relations. This dynamic is discussed in Section C.  
B. VIETNAM’S ECONOMIC TIES WITH TAIWAN 
This section investigates economic relations between Vietnam and Taiwan in 
three dimensions: trade, investment, and labor flows. To explore whether there was a 
relative decline in the importance of the Taiwanese economy relative to China, Vietnam’s 
trade and investment with China are also examined for comparison. Because the two 
countries are at different stages of development, Vietnam and Taiwan have 
complementary economies. Taiwan is a big manufacturer of consumer goods, such as 
motorcycles and footwear, and Vietnam is a source of raw material, such as rubber, and 
cheap labor.54 Taiwan supplies Vietnam with raw material for its own manufacturing, 
such as petroleum and materials for the textile industry.55  Vietnam also supplies a large 
number of migrant workers for Taiwan’s industries, which are facing a shortage of labor. 
These factors have contributed to the trade between both countries, as well as Taiwanese 
investments in Vietnam.  
                                                 
54 Vietnam supplies Taiwan with rubber. See “Taiwan Potential Still Untapped,” Vietnam News, 
December 21, 2013. Vietnam supplies Taiwan with a significant number of workers. See “Taiwan the 
Largest Importer of Vietnamese Migrant Workers,” Focus Taiwan, March 3, 2016.  
55 “Taiwan Potential Still Untapped,” Vietnam News, December 21, 2013. 
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Earlier research has suggested that Taiwan’s economic relations with Southeast 
Asia has declined since 1997.56 The Asian financial crisis and Taiwan’s termination of 
the construction of a fourth nuclear plant contributed to a decline in Taiwan’s growth 
rates.57 Trade with Southeast Asia did not grow as much as it did in the 1990s, and 
Taiwanese investment in the region declined.58 While Vietnam’s trade with Taiwan fit 
into this pattern of decline, unlike other Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam continued to 
attract an increasing amount of Taiwanese FDI into the country. Hence, Taiwan remained 
an important economic partner from 2000 up to 2016.  
1. Rapidly Increasing Trade with China and Relative Decline in Trade 
with Taiwan from 2000 
Vietnam’s trade with Taiwan has grown 10–15 percent year to year; however, the 
growth in trade between Vietnam and China since 2000 has surpassed the value of trade 
between Vietnam and Taiwan.59 Table 5 shows that over time, the percentage of 
Vietnam’s trade with Taiwan as a percentage of total trade has gradually decreased. 
Trade between Vietnam and Taiwan was almost 9.5 percent of total trade in 1995, nearly 
two percentage points more than Vietnam’s trade with China in the same year. However, 
in 2015, the share of Vietnamese–Taiwanese trade decreased over time to 3.5 percent. 
Vietnam’s trade with China grew significantly; from 2000 to 2005, the value of Vietnam–
China trade as a percentage of total trade more than doubled. Trade with China alone 
accounted for 20 percent of Vietnam’s total trade in 2015. The value is equivalent to 34 
percent of Vietnam’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2015, dwarfing the 6 percent 
equivalent of Vietnam–Taiwan trade.  
Table 6 shows the top 10 trading partners to Vietnam in terms of value of goods 
traded. China was the third largest trading partner to Vietnam in 2000 while Taiwan was 
the fourth largest. By 2005, China had taken the top position while Taiwan had become 
                                                 
56 Samuel C. Y. Ku, “Political Economy Relations of Taiwan and China with Southeast Asia,” in 
China and Southeast Asia: Global Changes and Regional Challenges (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2005), 268–269. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Refer to Table 5. 
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the fifth largest trading partner. In 2010 and 2015, China remained the top trading 
partner, and constant growth of Vietnam–Taiwan trade ensured that Taiwan remained the 
fifth largest trading partner. 
 Percentage of Vietnam’s Trade with Taiwan and China over Table 5.  
Total Trade and GDP60 
Trade with n as a Percentage 
of Total Trade 
Trade with n as a Percentage 
of GDP 
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
n = Taiwan 
9.44 7.08 6.86 5.41 3.55 4.69 6.81 8.21 7.31 6.02 
n = China 
7.73 9.75 30.90 17.40 20.17 3.85 9.38 37.01 23.50 34.23 
 Vietnam’s Top 10 Trading Partners 2000–2015 Table 6.  
(by Value of Goods Traded)61 
No. 2000 2005 2010 2015 
1 Japan China China China 
2 Singapore Japan United States United States 
3 China United States Japan South Korea 
4 Taiwan Singapore South Korea Japan 
5 South Korea Taiwan Taiwan Taiwan 
6 Australia South Korea Thailand Thailand 
7 Thailand Thailand Singapore Singapore 
8 United States Australia Malaysia Germany 
9 Germany Malaysia Australia Hong Kong 
10 Hong Kong Germany Germany Malaysia 
 
                                                 
60Adapted from ASEAN Secretariat Macroeconomic Database and ASEAN statistics 
(https://data.aseanstats.org/), National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China 
(http://www.stats.gov.cn/), Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/FSCE000F/FSCE000F), United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics 
(https://comtrade.un.org/), World Bank (https://data.worldbank.org/) and World Trade Organization 
(http://stat.wto.org/StatisticalProgram/WSDBStatProgramSeries.aspx?Language=E). 
61 Adapted from Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/FSCE000F/FSCE000F) and United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics 
(https://comtrade.un.org/). Data for 1995 is not available. 
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Vietnam faces trade dependency with both Taiwan and China as it imports more 
than it exports. Although the value of Taiwan’s trade with Vietnam has been less than 
China’s trade with Vietnam since 2000, Taiwan has remained an important trade partner 
for Vietnam and has been committed to furthering trade and economic relations. For 
instance, Vietnam regularly receives Taiwanese officials in the country for cooperation 
opportunities.62 In 2011, 72 Taiwanese enterprises visited Vietnam to explore trade and 
investment opportunities.63 Commenting on the delegation, the Vietnam Chamber of 
Commerce stated that Vietnam has 500,000 businesses “ready to cooperate with the 
Taiwanese business community.”64 In 2013 alone, 550 Vietnamese businesses met 
Taiwanese businessmen from Taipei for talks on business opportunities in Vietnam.65 
One of the reasons behind continued cooperation is the rising cost of labor in China, 
where many Taiwanese firms have built factories. Taiwanese firms have been relocating 
to Vietnam, where there is a large supply of labor to keep operating costs low.66  
2. Taiwan as a Major FDI Source in Vietnam since 2000 
Taiwan remained one of the top investors in Vietnam in the 2000s and 2010s. 
Taiwan’s investment in Vietnam has been increasing as more and more Taiwanese 
companies relocate to Vietnam. According to the Foreign Investment Agency in Hanoi, 
foreign-invested sectors created more than 200,000 jobs in 2008 and employed 1.4 
million people.67 Taiwan is a major contributor to the creation of jobs in Vietnam. To 
further attract Taiwanese investment, in 2007, the Vietnamese government approved the 
establishment of an office in Taiwan to promote investment.68 
                                                 
62 See Bureau of Foreign Trade, Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
https://www.trade.gov.tw/English/ 
63 “Taiwanese Courting Vietnamese Business,” Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs, October 20, 
2011.  
64 Ibid. 
65 “Vietnam Promotes Ties with Taiwan,” Intellinews, August 1, 2013. 
66 “Taiwanese Firms Look South to Vietnam to Beat Costs,” Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
October 20, 2011. 
67 “Foreign Direct Investment in Vietnam Triples in 2008: Gov’t,” China Post, December 27, 2008. 
68 “Vietnam to Set up Investment Promotion Office in ‘China’s Taiwan,’ Xinhua News Agency, May 
14, 2007. 
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In 2008, foreign direct investment tripled in Vietnam, and a big part of the 
increase came from Taiwan.69 Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that Prime 
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung attended the ground-breaking ceremony for a $7.8 billion 
Taiwanese-invested complex in central Ha Tinh province.70 Dung commented on the 
scale of the steel-port development: “This is the biggest foreign-invested project in 
Vietnam in terms of both scale and investment capital. It is of great significance to Ha 
Tinh province in particular, and to the central region and the country in general in 
economic restructuring.”71 A year earlier, Vietnam had reported the opening of two 
factories, with a total investment of $80 million, by Taiwan’s Foxconn Group in Bac 
Ninh province.72 
Taiwanese investment jumped by $583 million over a five-year period from 2005 
to 2010. Investment further increased to $725 million in 2015, making Taiwan the fourth 
largest investor in Vietnam and contributing 6 percent of total investment in the 
country.73 China’s FDI has increased rapidly since 2010; however, it has invested only 
slightly more than half of what Taiwan invested in 2015 (see Table 7). Table 8 shows the 
top foreign investors in Vietnam in 2010 and 2015; Taiwan was the sixth largest investor 
in Vietnam in 2010 and the fourth largest investor in 2015. As of 2016, Taiwan has 
invested in 2,509 projects worth more than $31 billion in Vietnam.74 
                                                 
69 “Foreign Direct Investment in Vietnam Triples,” China Post. 
70 “PM Launches Taiwan-Invested Steel-Port Complex,” Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 9, 
2008. 
71 Ibid. 
72 “Foxconn inaugurates two hi-tech factories,” Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 31, 
2007. 
73 Vietnam’s total FDI in 2015 was 11.8 billion, according to the World Bank. 
74 “About the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Vietnam,” Taipei Economic and Cultural 
Office, Vietnam, May 26, 2016. 
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 Amount of Taiwanese and Chinese Investment in Vietnam Table 7.  
in Millions, USD75 
Source Country 2005 2010 2015 
China  20.8 115.14 381.01 
Taiwan  93.9 677.51 725.04 
 
 Top 10 Foreign Investors in Vietnam in Millions, USD (Flow)76 Table 8.  
No. Investor 2010 Investor 2015 
1 Netherlands 1543.41 Republic of Korea 3488.0 
2 Republic of Korea 1335.73 Malaysia 1285.0 
3 Singapore 1078.31 Japan 954.95 
4 Japan 1051.88 Taiwan 725.03 
5 United States 927.09 Samoa 723.16 
6 Taiwan 677.51 United Kingdom 658.91 
7 Cayman Islands 292.19 Singapore 638.47 
8 Virgin Islands 264.84 Virgin Islands 632.17 
9 [Unknown] 192.45 Hong Kong 620.23 
10 Malaysia 131.12 China 381.01 
 
3. Taiwan as a Major Destination for Vietnamese Labor since 2000 
In 1999, Taiwan and Vietnam signed an agreement to allow Vietnamese labor 
into Taiwan.77 Since then, Vietnamese migrant labor has quickly expanded to one of the 
major sources of workers for Taiwan.78 In 1999, there were 131 Vietnamese workers in 
Taiwan.79 In 2004, Vietnamese workers totalled 90,241, which made up 28.5 percent of 
                                                 
75 The 2005 data are from APEC (http://statistics.apec.org/index.php/bilateral_linkage/index); the rest 
are from ASEAN statistics (https://data.aseanstats.org/). Data for 1995 and 2000 are not available.  
76 Adapted from ASEAN statistics (https://data.aseanstats.org/). Data for 1995, 2000 and 2005 are not 
available. 
77 Tran Thi Duyen, “Human Resources Cooperation between Vietnam and Taiwan: Situations, 





all foreign workers in Taiwan.80 In 2005, Taiwan suspended the Vietnamese from 
working as domestic helpers and caregivers due to the high rate of turnover.81 In 2008, 
Vietnam started a pilot project to train its workers for industries with a high demand for 
foreign workers, such as welding, hotel and restaurant services, health care, and 
electronics.82 In 2010, the rate of Vietnamese labor entering Taiwan’s market increased 
again to near 2004 levels; 80,030 Vietnamese workers entered Taiwan and made up 21.1 
percent of all foreign workers in Taiwan.83 In the last 16 years, Taiwan became the top 
destination for Vietnamese labor. In 2016, Taiwan was the largest importer of 
Vietnamese workers, employing a total of 184,920.84 Vietnamese labor has also grown to 
become the second largest group in Taiwan as of 2016.  
Vietnam’s attempts to maintain economic relations with Taiwan are apparent. As 
mentioned earlier, Vietnam risked relations with China by inviting Taiwan for the 2006 
APEC meeting to signal that Taiwan was an important member of the group. To keep 
investors interested in Vietnam, it has regularly invited Taiwanese businesses to the 
country and set up an investment office in Taiwan to promote the country. Vietnam also 
promptly apologized to Taiwan when Vietnamese protestors damaged Taiwanese 
factories during demonstrations targeted at China in May 2014.85 In the aftermath of the 
incidents, Vietnam also discussed providing compensation for the affected Taiwanese 
businesses.86 Bui Trong Van, head of the Vietnam Economic and Cultural Office in 
Taipei, noted that Taiwan had approximately $28 billion worth of investment in Vietnam 
and that this investment has been important to both Taiwan and Vietnam.87 Bui said in a 
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press conference that he hoped “Taiwanese businesses will continue to stay and invest in 
Vietnam.”88 Dependent on Taiwan for foreign capital and a destination for its excess 
labor, Vietnam hopes Taiwan investors neither pull out of Vietnam nor stop importing 
Vietnamese laborers after the incidents.89 
C. COMPETING CLAIMS OVER SOUTH CHINA SEA FEATURES 
The first subsection traces Vietnam’s South China Sea disputes with China and 
foreign policy approaches to deal with the disputes from 2000 to 2016. Prior to the late 
2000s, Vietnam did not perceive China as a threat.90 Since the late 2000s, with the 
escalation of conflicts in the South China Sea, Vietnam has regarded China’s actions in 
the South China Sea as an increasing threat to its sovereignty. Vietnam has been trying to 
gain international support for its South China Sea cause by making use of ASEAN to 
internationalize its cause as well as signing bilateral partnerships with regional countries 
to cooperate on regional maritime security. Vietnam’s actions show that it is increasingly 
trying to counter China; however, this strategy has not led Vietnam to pursue closer 
relations with Taiwan because of the latter’s own South China Sea claims. 
The second subsection looks at Vietnam’s South China Sea disputes with Taiwan 
as well as Vietnam’s public statements since 2000 to protest Taiwanese actions. Like 
China, Taiwan also claims a large swathe of the South China Sea, with parts overlapping 
Vietnam’s claims. One major contention is Taiwan’s control over the island of Itu Aba, 
also known as Taiping Island, to which Vietnam also lays claims. Although Taiwan has 
been trying to promote dialogue as a mechanism for achieving stability in the South 
China Sea through what has been called “ecological diplomacy,” Taiwan has been 
undertaking actions to assert its sovereignty, for example, by visiting the islands under its 
control. In addition to Vietnam not cooperating with Taiwan on this issue, the competing 
claims between Vietnam and Taiwan were an obstacle to bilateral relations in the late 
2000s into the 2010s. 
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1. China 
a. Stable South China Sea Situation from 2000 to 2008  
According to Ramses Amer, in the late 1990s, Vietnam and China made some 
progress in the management of the South China Sea disputes. In 2000, the year that Chen 
Shui-bian took office, no South China Sea incidents caused tensions between Vietnam 
and China. Amer attributes this easing to the greater efforts by both countries to manage 
conflicts in the South China Sea through “continued talks, exploring potential 
cooperation in certain fields, and by exercising mutual self-restraint.”91 In December 
2000, Vietnam and China signed the “Joint Statement on All-Round Cooperation in the 
New Century,” which included a section that affirmed the need to conduct peaceful 
negotiations to find a solution to the South China Sea disputes. From 2001 to 2008, 
although there were incidents between the two countries, Amer characterizes these 
incidents as causing only limited periods of tensions, with the situation remaining 
relatively stable.92 
b. Increase in South China Sea Conflicts from 2008 to 2014 
The intensity of the conflicts increased in the last decade, which also coincided 
with the period that Ma Ying-jeou was president. Le Hong Hiep details China’s 
“increasing assertiveness” in a 2015 paper, looking at the period from 2007 to 2014 and 
listing 18 “major actions” carried out by the Chinese, of which five directly confront 
Vietnam.93 Of note are the mid-2011 incidents during which Chinese ships cut the cables 
of Vietnamese survey vessels Binh Minh 02 and Viking II in Vietnam’s Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ).94 Thayer in a 2011 paper also details the incidents between 
Vietnam and China in the South China Sea, focusing on fishing disputes.95 In 2009 alone, 
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China detained or impounded 33 Vietnamese fishing boats and 433 crew members96. 
China continued its “harassment” of the Vietnamese fishermen in 2010 and 2011, which 
included China seizing the Vietnamese fishermen’s catch, fishing tools, and other 
navigational or maintenance items. In one incident that took place in July 2011, the 
Chinese navy crew allegedly beat a Vietnamese fishing boat captain after boarding his 
boat.  
During this period, Vietnam sought cooperation with regional countries to gain 
support in its attempts to seek maritime security, especially against Chinese threats. 
Vietnam established strategic partnerships with South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and 
Singapore.97 The strategic partnerships are usually wide-ranging and cover economic, 
political and military cooperation with the aim of promoting peace, stability and 
prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. Vietnam's strategic partnership with Singapore 
explicitly calls for bilateral cooperation to maintain peace, freedom of navigation, 
maritime security in South China Sea as well as the resolution of disputes via 
international law.98 In 2009 and 2013, Vietnam established comprehensive partnerships 
with Australia and the United States respectively.99 As part of the Vietnam-U.S. 
comprehensive partnership, the U.S. would assist Vietnam in maritime capacity building 
by providing $18 million to bolster the capacity of Vietnamese coastal patrol units and 
giving five fast patrol vessels to the Vietnamese Coast Guard.100 It is also worth noting 
that Vietnam had established a strategic partnership with China in 2008.101 
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c. Turning Point in Vietnam’s Perception of China in 2014 
The conflicts between Vietnam and China culminated in 2014 when China 
stationed its deep-water drilling rig Haiyang Shiyou 981 (HYSY-981) in Vietnam’s EEZ 
and deployed more than 100 vessels to protect it.102 According to Le, the level of 
aggression that China displayed was a level “unseen since the 1988 Sino-Vietnamese 
naval clash in the Spratlys.”103 In addition to deploying a huge arsenal of vessels, China 
also confronted Vietnamese vessels by ramming them and spraying water cannons at 
them. On May 26, a Vietnamese ship sank near the rig after being rammed by a Chinese 
vessel.104 Vietnamese officials attempted repeatedly to contact their Chinese counterparts 
to no avail; China simply ignored Vietnam’s protests on this matter.105 
This incident was seen as a turning point in Vietnam–China relations. According 
to Vuving, “Sino–Vietnamese relations passed a point of no return” with the 2014 
incident, shifting Vietnam’s strategy from pursuing solidarity and engagement with 
China to a posture more inclined toward balancing.106 It is hard to overstate the impact of 
the HYSY-981 incident on Vietnam. The incident sparked massive protests in Vietnam, 
with protestors setting fire to foreign-owned factories in Binh Duong province in attempts 
to destroy Chinese property; these demonstrations also destroyed Taiwanese factories, as 
mentioned previously. Vietnamese officials made frequent public statements to signal 
their opposition to the oil rig, reached out to ASEAN and the international community to 
publicize the issue and to garner support for itself, as well as directly confronted China by 
deploying maritime law enforcement vessels to the conflict sites.107 
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Vietnam continued to pursue what Hiep describes as “alliance politics.”108 
Vietnam announced in 2015 that it would establish a strategic partnership with the 
Philippines, the only other ASEAN member at that time to take a hard stance against 
China on South China Sea claims.109 Vietnam also engaged Japan extensively, and in 
August 2014 shortly after China removed the oil rig from the area, Japan announced the 
donation of six patrol boats for Vietnam to boost the latter’s maritime defense 
capability.110 Vietnam did not attempt to forge closer relations with Taiwan even after 
2014. Instead, throughout the late 2000s and 2010s, Vietnam pursued its balancing 
strategy by reaching out to ASEAN members and regional powers such as Russia, India, 
Japan, and the United States.111  
2. Taiwan 
a. Stable South China Sea Situation in the Early 2000s and Escalation of 
Conflicts in the Late 2000s 
Similar to the situation with China in the 2000s, there were very few documented 
disputes between Taiwan and Vietnam during this period. The first signs of friction 
showed in 2004 when Vietnam condemned Taiwan for constructing a tower in the 
Spratly Islands ostensibly for observing birds.112 In response, Taiwan said it would not 
“respond militarily” to Vietnam’s protest and would seek a peaceful resolution.113 In 
2007 and 2008, Vietnam made several protests against Taiwan for drill exercises, 
construction activities, and inspection tours on or near the Spratly Islands.114 Research 
did not yield any counter protests by Taiwan. Although there were some disputes over the 
Spratly Islands during the 2000s, the overall situation was fairly stable and peaceful.   
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b. Increase in South China Sea Disputes between Vietnam and Taiwan in 
the 2010s 
The 2010s saw a general escalation of tensions in the South China Sea. Table 9 
shows the actions taken by Vietnam and Taiwan to assert South China Sea claims from 
2007 to 2016. In 2011, Taiwan formed a task force to monitor the situation after Vietnam 
announced it would hold live-fire exercises on June 13, 2011, following a verbal dispute 
with China. In 2012, the start of Ma Ying-jeou’s second term, there was an increase in 
Taiwanese actions to assert its sovereignty rights and claims in the South China Sea. In 
May 2012, Taiwan’s Central News Agency reported that Ma Ying-jeou “reaffirmed 
Taiwan’s sovereignty in the South China Sea” and vowed to use peaceful means to 
resolve the territorial disputes.115 Following Vietnamese protests over Taiwan’s exercise 
in the Spratly in July 2012, Taiwan reiterated its claim to Itu Aba in August 2012. 
The actions, protests, and counter-protests surrounding the South China Sea from 
Vietnam and Taiwan carried into the mid-2010s. In June 2015, the Taiwanese Coast 
Guard launched new ships to patrol waters in the South China Sea.116 Ma Ying-jeou even 
boarded one of the new ships to observe rescue drills in waters near Kaohsiung.117 In 
January 2016, months before Ma Ying-jeou left office, Ma visited Itu Aba to assert 
Taiwanese sovereignty and promote it as an island capable of sustaining human 
habitation.118 
On the one hand, Taiwan contributed to the easing of tensions in the South China 
Sea by promoting its South China Sea Peace Initiative, which calls for peaceful 
settlement of disputes through dialogue and consultations as well as freedom of 
navigation.119 One the other hand, Taiwan has been a party to disputes and has taken 
some unilateral actions that escalated tensions. Vietnam did not publicly express interest 
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in the peace initiative, however. It is likely that Vietnam sees the cooperation as 
unfeasible because of two reasons, one, Vietnam sees Taiwan's claims to the South China 
Sea in an equally bad light as it sees China's, two, Vietnam risks irrevocably angering 
China if it jumped onboard the initiative.  
 Actions Taken by Vietnam and Taiwan to Assert South China Sea Table 9.  
Claims from 2004 to 2016 
Date Subject Verbatim extract Source 
November 
2004 
Vietnam protests against 
Taiwan’s construction of a 
tower in the Spratly islands. 
“Any act taken at Truong Sa 
archipelago without Vietnam’s 
approval is a violation of 
Vietnam’s territorial 
sovereignty. Vietnam 
expresses its strong protest and 
demands Taiwan immediately 
put an end to its violation of 
Vietnam’s territorial 
sovereignty, not execute 
similar activities at Truong Sa 









Vietnam protests against 
Taiwan’s exercise in the 
Spratly Islands. 
“Vietnam has sufficient 
historical evidence and a legal 
basis for asserting its 
sovereignty over the Paracel 
and Spratley Archipelagos. All 
activities undertaken in the 
Paracel and Spratley 
Archipelagos without the 
consent of Vietnam are in 
violation of Vietnam’s 
sovereignty. Vietnam protests 
against these activities and 
demands that Taiwan does not 
conduct any similar exercises 
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Date Subject Verbatim extract Source 
September 
2007 
Vietnamese protests against 
Taiwan’s construction 
works in the Spratly 
Islands. 
“Vietnam has protested 
Taiwan’s resumption of its 
plan to build infrastructure 
facilities on the Truong Sa 
[Spratly] archipelago, 
island of Ba Binh, the Foreign 
Ministry spokesman Le Dung 







Vietnam protests against 
Taiwanese inspection of Itu 
Aba island. 
“Vietnam strongly protests any 
activities violating the 
sovereignty of Vietnam over 
these archipelagos. We urge 
Taiwan to immediately cancel 
their inspection plan in the 








Taiwan reiterates its claims 
to the Paracel Islands and 
the Spratly Islands. 
“Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Republic of China 
(Taiwan) reiterates that the 
Nansha Islands, the Shisha 
Islands, the Chungsha Islands 
and the Tungsha Islands, as 
well as their surrounding 
waters, sea beds and subsoil, 
are all an inherent part of the 









Ma Ying-jeou affirms 
Taiwan’s sovereignty over 
South China Sea features. 
“President Ma Ying-jeou on 
Sunday reaffirmed Taiwan’s 
sovereignty in the South China 
Sea, vowing to adopt peaceful 
approaches to resolving 
territorial disputes amid 
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Date Subject Verbatim extract Source 
July 2012 
Vietnam protests Taiwan’s 
activities in the Spratly 
Islands. 
“‘Activities of parties in 
Truong Sa archipelago without 
Viet Nam’s permission violate 
Viet Nam’s sovereignty and 
international laws, especially 
the 1982 UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, go against 
the spirit of the Declaration on 
the Conduct of Parties in the 
East Sea (DOC) and cause 
tension in the East Sea,’ the 
representative stressed. The 
representative also asked 
Taiwan to stop similar 









Taiwan’s releases statement 
on Itu Aba island. 
“The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs reiterated Taiwan’s 
claim to Taiping Island 
yesterday, following a report 
by Vietnamese media that 
Taiwan’s plan to conduct an 
exercise there was a violation 









Taiwan protests Vietnam’s 
claims to the South China 
Sea. 
“The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA) expresses its 
serious concern and firm 
opposition over Vietnam’s 
Law on the Sea, which 
erroneously places the Shisha 
(Paracel) Islands and Nansha 
(Spratly) Islands under 
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Date Subject Verbatim extract Source 
June 2015 
Taiwan commissions new 
ships for duty in the South 
China Sea. 
“Taiwan’s coast guard on 
Saturday commissioned its 
biggest ships for duty in the 
form of two 3,000-ton patrol 
vessels, as the island boosts 
defences amid concerns about 
China’s growing footprint in 
the disputed South China Sea. 
The new vessels will be able to 
dock at a new port being 
constructed on Taiping Island, 
the largest of the naturally 
occurring Spratly Islands in the 
South China Sea, before the 






Taiwan’s interior minister 
visits Itu Aba island. 
“MOFA spokeswoman Eleanor 
Wang said Interior Minister 
Chen Wei-zen’s visit to 
Taiping on December 12 was 
intended to inspect the 
construction results on the 
island and a move to exercise 






March 2016 Vietnam protests Taiwan’s tour of the Spratly Islands. 
“Vietnam on Thursday hit back 
at Taiwan for taking 
international media on a tour of 
a disputed island in the South 
China Sea, saying the 
‘illegal and worthless’ trip had 
further raised tensions in the 
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D. SUMMARY 
Vietnam–Taiwan relations were supported by economic cooperation particularly 
during Chen Shu-bian’s presidency, and the robustness of Vietnam–Taiwan economic 
relations set the tone for overall relations. While there were political incidents between 
the two countries because China was pressuring Vietnam to limit its engagement of 
Taiwan, strong economic ties between Vietnam and Taiwan mitigated a downturn in 
relations. Although China’s trade with Vietnam has surpassed Taiwan’s trade with 
Vietnam, Taiwan has remained a very important economic partner with high levels of 
Taiwanese FDI in Vietnam and employment of large numbers of Vietnamese migrant 
workers. South China Sea conflicts between Vietnam and Taiwan were not a major issue 
obstructing cooperation during this period, and visits by Taiwanese officials to Vietnam 
to further economic cooperation took place regularly. Vietnam tried to balance its 
relations with China and Taiwan from 2000 to 2008 and maintained strong economic ties 
with Taiwan. Political relations diminished slightly as a result of China’s pressure on 
Vietnam. 
During Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency, economic cooperation between Vietnam and 
Taiwan continued, with high levels of trade, FDI, and labor flows. There were few 
documented political incidents between Vietnam and Taiwan; however, relations did not 
seem to improve substantially. As already mentioned, there was only one ministerial visit 
made between 2008 and 2016. It was during this period that conflicts in the South China 
Sea escalated among China, Vietnam, and Taiwan. Despite its attempts to push for 
dialogue and other peaceful means of resolving the conflicts, Taiwan’s assertion of its 
sovereignty rights prevented improvement in relations with Vietnam, unlike what it 
achieved with other Southeast Asia countries during this period. Competing claims 
between Vietnam and Taiwan also hindered progress in bilateral relations although the 
overall political situation in the region was conducive.  
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III. SINGAPORE 
This chapter analyzes Singapore’s political, economic, and military interactions 
with Taiwan from 2000 to 2016 to investigate the conventional wisdom that Singapore’s 
relations with Taiwan deteriorated during Chen Shui-bian’s presidency (2000–2008) and 
improved during Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency (2008–2016) because of the decline of 
Taiwan’s economy relative to China as well as Chinese pressure on Southeast Asian 
countries with regard to conducting relations with Taiwan.  
This chapter finds that all dimensions of Singapore’s relations with Taiwan 
deteriorated from 2000 to 2008 because of the pro-independence policies taken by the 
Chen Shui-bian administration that created tense cross-Strait relations and contributed to 
insecurity in the Asia-Pacific region. From 2008, Singapore’s relations with Taiwan 
improved when Ma Ying-jeou became President because Ma advocated a conciliatory 
approach toward China and eased cross-Strait tensions by promising a “no independence” 
stance. 
The first section of this chapter examines Singapore’s relations with Taiwan 
during the administrations of Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou. It covers political 
conflicts between Singapore and Taiwan that arose from the two countries’ different 
outlooks on Taiwan’s independence and the One-China policy during Chen Shui-bian’s 
administration. The first section also covers how Singapore–Taiwan relations improved 
from 2008 after Ma Ying-jeou’s policies eased cross-Strait tensions, which gave 
Singapore space to engage Taiwan without invoking harsh criticism from China. The 
second section examines trade and investment relations between Singapore and Taiwan 
as compared to Singapore’s economic relations with China. The free trade agreement—
called the Agreement between Singapore and the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu on Economic Partnership (ASTEP)—signed between the 
two countries in 2013 is discussed as well. The third section looks at developments in 
military cooperation between Singapore and Taiwan from 2000 to 2016. 
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A. POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SINGAPORE AND TAIWAN 
Singapore’s relations with Taiwan developed in the late 1960s and grew over the 
years, exceeding Taiwan’s relations with its own diplomatic partners. Singapore and 
Taiwan enjoyed strong economic relations and unique military cooperation that continued 
after Singapore officially established diplomatic relations with China in 1990. Bilateral 
relations in the 1970s and 1980s were cemented by a number of common goals, including 
anti-communism, as well as a close personal friendship between Singapore’s former 
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and Taiwan’s former President Chiang Ching-kuo.131 
Singapore–Taiwan political relations declined to some extent in the mid-1990s because 
of Lee Teng-hui’s pro-independence sensibilities; Singapore was a staunch believer in the 
One-China policy and did not agree with Lee Teng-hui’s “anti-status quo diplomacy.”132 
However, economic and military relations remained strong with high levels of trade 
between the two countries and annual troop deployment in upwards of 15,000 
Singaporean soldiers to Taiwan for military training.133 
1. Chen Shui-bian’s Term as President (2000–2008)  
In Chen Shui-bian’s first year of presidency, he articulated a conciliatory rhetoric 
toward Beijing and undertook a number of goodwill gestures, such as advancing the idea 
of “political integration” between China and Taiwan as well as lifting the ban on direct 
transportation, trade and postal links between Taiwan and China.134 Singapore was 
encouraged by Chen’s approach toward China and saw an opportunity for Singapore and 
Taiwan relations to continue on their positive trajectory. Noting the handover of power 
from the Kuomintang (KMT), a party with which Singapore’s leadership was familiar, 
Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said to the DPP that “Singapore and Taiwan 
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have enjoyed friendly relations for many years. We are confident that this will continue 
regardless of changes in the leadership in Taiwan.”135 However, the DPP government did 
not reciprocate as warmly, perceiving Singapore Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s 
comments about Taiwan as a snub. In June 2000, Senior Minister Lee announced that he 
would visit Taiwan but said that the visit was not to mediate between Taiwan and 
China.136 He said pointedly, “I’ve had my fingers burnt, or rather my ears seared, trying 
to play a good Samaritan for Lee Teng-hui, so I’m cautious.”137 Senior Minister Lee also 
dismissed the possibility of inviting Chen Shui-bian to Singapore as that would have 
violated the One-China policy.138 In response, during the process of confirming the 
senior minister’s visit, Taiwan’s foreign minister hinted that Lee would still be welcome 
in Taiwan although he was now “less friendly.”139 Annette Lu, Taiwan’s vice president 
at the time, commented that foreign dignitaries should neither guide nor decide Taiwan’s 
future, indirectly telling Lee Kuan Yew to stay out of cross-Strait matters.140   
Shortly after Chen Shui-bian took office, Singapore also responded favorably to 
Taiwan’s proposal for a free trade agreement; however, the plan would not come to 
fruition.141 In an interview with Taiwanese news outlet China Times in October 2000, 
Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew responded to a question regarding the future of 
Singapore–Taiwan relations, saying that relations between the new government in 
Taiwan and Singapore would exceed the bilateral relations under Lee Teng-hui.142 Lee 
Kuan Yew also noted that “in the last six years, economic cooperation between Taiwan 
and Singapore ha[d] been at a low key.”143 Talks between Singapore and Taiwan on a 
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free trade agreement took place in early 2002, but by 2003, the talks had broken down.144 
In March 2002, Taiwan and Singapore held preliminary talks on the free trade agreement 
(FTA) and Taiwan’s Board of Foreign Trade director Wayne Wu hoped that “significant 
progress” would be made by the end of 2002.145 Ominously, in June 2002, China warned 
countries with which it had diplomatic ties against signing FTAs with Taiwan: “If such 
countries sign free-trade agreements with Taiwanese authorities, they are bound to bring 
political trouble on themselves.”146 Responding to a question by a reporter, Chinese 
Foreign Trade Minister Shi Guangsheng said that China was paying attention to recent 
attempts by Taiwan to sign FTAs with major economies. In October 2003, Senior 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew said that Singapore had welcomed talks on a FTA when Taiwan 
broached the topic, but the trade deal did not progress because Taiwan wanted to 
negotiate as a “political entity” instead of an “economic player.”147 Senior Minister Lee 
said that Singapore would maintain economic ties with Taiwan but would not confer 
official recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign entity.148 The DPP government had wanted 
to use the name “Taiwan” during negotiations instead of a less politically sensitive 
name.149 In 2010, when the Ma Ying-jeou administration was negotiating the FTA with 
Singapore, DPP lawmakers criticized the government’s failure to use Taiwan’s official 
name as well as the term “economic cooperation agreement” instead of “free trade 
agreement.”150 
The lack of progress toward an FTA reflected the contribution of Taiwan’s 
political aspirations to the deterioration in Singapore–Taiwan relations. Singapore, as an 
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adherent of the One-China policy could not accept Taiwan’s request to present itself as a 
sovereign. Although in the 1960s–80s Singapore had pursued de facto diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan and continued to maintain such relations into the 2000s, Singapore 
was unwilling to go out of its way to accommodate the DPP’s rhetoric of Taiwan’s 
independence—because Singapore’s leaders believed that this rhetoric would provoke a 
military reaction from China and threaten the peace and security of Asia. 
Problems between Singapore and Taiwan continued in the subsequent years. In 
July 2002, Singapore refused to support Taiwan’s admission to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). According to a Chinese media report, Singapore had blocked 
Taiwan because China had pressured Singapore to do so.151 However, Singapore’s 
Ministry of Trade and Industry dismissed the report and said that the objection was due to 
discriminatory practices on the part of Taiwan.152 Singapore pointed out that it had once 
supported Taiwan’s bid to join the WTO in the early 1990s, but “blatant discrimination” 
forced Singapore to exercise its rights as a WTO Government Procurement Agreement 
member to safeguard its interests.153 Taiwan had not offered Singapore the same 
concessions it was offering to the U.S., European Commission, Japan, Korea, 
Switzerland, Canada, Hong Kong, Norway and Iceland.154 Singapore also said that 
Taiwan had not adequately addressed all of Singapore’s concerns and requests.155 
After Chen Shui-bian’s first term, deadlock in disagreements with China over 
what constituted One-China and Chen’s rejection of the 1992 Consensus clouded 
Taiwan’s development of relations with mainland China.156 Chen grew increasingly 
provocative, and the cross-Strait situation deteriorated with the DPP’s unilateral moves to 
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obtain de jure independence.157 Disillusioned with the revisionist stance of the DPP 
government, Singapore increasingly took on a more critical position against Taiwan, 
especially after Chen Shui-bian launched a nationwide consultative referendum on the 
status of Taiwan that coincided with the March 2004 presidential election. In June 2004, 
outgoing Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong warned Taiwan against declaring 
independence and said that it would result in a war.158 In July 2004, Singapore’s new 
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong undertook a visit to Taiwan, after the fashion of 
previous prime ministers, to understand what was taking place domestically.159 Prime 
Minister Lee addressed his hosts as “friends and contacts” and said that despite China’s 
stiff rebuke, Singapore would not change its approach to conducting foreign relations.160 
Lee also said that Singapore seeks friendship with all countries, especially immediate 
neighbors and major powers.161 While displaying a commitment to maintain relations 
with Taiwan, Lee nonetheless made it clear that Singapore would not support Taiwan if 
the latter initiated a conflict with China.162 In September 2004, Singapore’s Foreign 
Minister George Yeo entreated the United Nations General Assembly not to “allow the 
deteriorating relationship across the Taiwan Straits to get out of control.”163 Yeo 
pointedly said, “The push towards independence by certain groups in Taiwan is most 
dangerous because it will lead to war with mainland China and drag in other 
countries.”164 Table 10 shows some of the statements Singapore has made regarding 
Chen Shui-bian’s presidency; for a longer listing, see Appendix B. 
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Following Yeo’s address, already strained relations between Singapore and 
Taiwan plummeted further. Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Mark Chen accused Singapore of 
currying favour with China, calling Singapore a country the size of a piece of snot.165 In 
response, Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said other countries also believed 
Taiwan was “pursuing a dangerous course towards independence” and its “resort to 
intemperate language [could not] assuage these concerns.”166 The high-level conflict 
carried over to the Taiwanese society when protestors in Kaohsiung burned the Singapore 
flag to protest George Yeo’s speech to the United Nations General Assembly.167  
 Singapore’s Public Affirmation of One-China Policy and Table 10.  
Opposition to Taiwanese Independence 2000–2008 
Date Subject Verbatim Extract Source 
March 
2000 
On the DPP 
winning the 
presidential 
election in 2000, 
the first by the 
opposition 
“Singapore last night congratulated Mr 
Chen Shui-bian for winning the 
presidential election, which it said 
reflected the choice of the Taiwanese 
people. Asked about its impact on 
Singapore’s one-China policy, the 
spokesman said the policy had been 
consistent and it remained unchanged. 
‘Singapore recognises that there is only 
one China and that Taiwan is part of 
China. The Government of the Republic 
of Singapore recognises the Government 











after the DPP won 
the presidential 
election in 2000. 
“Mr Goh, on his part, has in the past two 
weeks been expressing concern that 
cross-Strait tension could destabilise 
Asia, and mar its hopes of economic 
recovery. He said yesterday: ‘I was 
concerned that although this is an 





                                                 
165 “Foreign Minister Slams Singapore,” Taipei Times, September 28, 2004.  
166 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore, “MFA Spokesman's Comments” (press release), September 
28, 2004, http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/speeches/view-html?filename=2004092801.htm. 
167 “Singapore Flag Burned in Angry Protest,” Taipei Times, October 2, 2004. 
168 “What S'pore Said of Victory,” Straits Times, March 19, 2000. 
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Date Subject Verbatim Extract Source 
issue will affect the stability and security 
of Asia. We are in Asia and therefore, as 
the neighbours of China, are concerned.’  
He said that Singapore’s position was 
clear: it recognised one China and that 
Taiwan was part of China.”169 
June 2004 On deteriorating China–Taiwan 
relations 
“Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok 
Tong has issued a warning against 
Taiwan independence, saying it would 
result in a war and a permanent rise in 














of his visit to 
Taiwan. 
“Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong 
yesterday reiterated Singapore’s 
commitment to the One China policy and 
said that Singapore could not support 
Taiwan if the latter provoked a cross-
Strait conflict. ‘If a war breaks out across 
the straits, we will be forced to choose 
between the two sides. As a friend of 
both sides, any decision will be painful. 
But if the conflict is provoked by 
Taiwan, then Singapore cannot support 









attempt to call for 
a referendum on 
Taiwan’s UN 
membership bid 
“Singapore’s ‘One China’ policy is clear 
and consistent. We remain firmly 
opposed to any unilateral move to alter 
the status of Taiwan. The proposal to put 
Taiwan’s UN membership bid under the 
title ‘Taiwan’ to a referendum is 
provocative and irresponsible. It does not 
further Taiwan’s interests in any way. It 
can only raise cross-strait tensions, 
reduce Taiwan’s international space, and 






24, 2007.  
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“Taiwan’s state-run aerospace company 
has been forbidden from displaying the 
name ‘Taiwan’ on its booth or showing 
the national emblem on its exhibits at an 
aviation show being held in Singapore, a 
company official said Tuesday. The 
organizers of Singapore Airshow 2008 
also banned a DVD recording of the 
March 2007 christening ceremony for the 
company’s upgraded indigenous defence 
fighters presided over by President Chen 
Shui-bian, said Aerospace Industrial 







20, 2008.  
 
Table 11 shows the notable visits that were undertaken by Singaporean and 
Taiwanese leadership from 1997 to 2015. Singaporean leaders visited Taiwan regularly in 
the 1990s, and data compiled from Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry Yearbook shows a 
continuous trend of such visits from 1997 to 2004, with a break in 2001. However, from 
2004 to 2008, there were no visits made by either side. The Taiwanese Foreign Ministry 
attributed the lack of visits to Singaporean restraint after Beijing’s harsh censure, but the 
suspension of visits was also due to Singapore–Taiwan tensions originating from 
conflicting views of the status of Taiwan. The aggressive Taiwanese media had also hurt 
Singapore–Taiwan interactions. Singapore had always advocated for a low-profile 
engagement of Taiwan to avoid offending China. The 2004 visit by Lee Hsien Loong was 
reported extensively by the Taiwanese media and caused Singapore discomfort. 
Commenting in 2008 on his frequent visits to Taiwan from the 1970s to the 1990s and the 
Taiwanese media, Lee Kuan Yew said, “When such visits are used by Taiwan’s media to 
provoke Beijing, they set back Taiwan-Singapore interactions.”174 
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 Notable Visits by Singaporean and Taiwanese Officials from 1997 Table 11.  
to 2015175 
Visitor  Position Year 
Goh Chok Tong (SG) Prime Minister 1997 (Transit) 
Tony Tan  (SG) Deputy Prime Minister 1997 
Lien Chan  (TW) Vice President 1998 
Goh Chok Tong (SG) Prime Minister 1998 
Lee Kuan Yew (SG) Senior Minister 1998 
S.R. Nathan  (SG) Ambassador-at-Large 1999 
Lee Kuan Yew (SG) Senior Minister 2000 
Chiang Pin-Kung (TW) Vice President of Legislative Yuan 2002 
Lee Kuan Yew (SG) Senior Minister 2002 
Mah Bow Tan (SG) Minister for National Development 2002 
Lee Hsien Loong (SG) Deputy Prime Minister 2004 
Lien Chan (TW) Representative of President 2009 
Yiin Chii-Ming (TW) Minister of Economic Affairs 2010 
Lien Chan (TW) Representative of President 2011 
Lee Kuan Yew  (SG) Minister Mentor 2011 
Ma Ying-jeou (TW) President 2015 (Lee Kuan 
Yew’s Funeral) 
 
Singapore continued to object to the DPP government’s attempts to obtain greater 
diplomatic recognition and the policy of independence for Taiwan into the late 2000s. 
According to a Taiwanese online news and commentary website, in 2006 Chen Shui-bian 
was refused transit by Singapore, and the Taiwanese community in Singapore had to take 
an hour-long boat ride to Batam, an Indonesian island near Singapore, to meet with Chen. 
When the DPP government attempted to put Taiwan’s United Nations membership bid to 
a referendum, in December 2007, Singapore condemned the attempt as “provocative and 
irresponsible.”176 In February 2008, Singapore refused to let Taiwan’s state-run 
aerospace company display the name “Taiwan” in English at the Singapore Airshow and 
                                                 
175 Adapted from author’s own compilation from various issues of the Republic of China Foreign 
Policy Yearbook (1997–2015). Missing years indicate no data or no notable visits. There are no data for the 
period before 1997. 
176 MFA Spokesman's Comments to media queries on the recent statements by the P5 opposing the 
Taiwan referendum, 24 December 2007,” Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 24, 2007. 
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only allowed the booth to use the Chinese version.177 Singapore also banned a DVD 
recording of an event that Chen Shui-bian had presided over.178  
2. Ma Ying-jeou’s Term as President (2008–2016) 
Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT had a very different view of Taiwan independence 
and cross-Strait relations. Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT’s One-China position was the 
basis for cross-Strait negotiations for decades.179 To ease cross-Strait tensions, Ma 
expressed that his administration would maintain the status quo by adhering to a “no 
unification, no independence, and no use of force” framework.180 China responded 
favorably, and throughout Ma’s first term, important breakthroughs were made in cross-
Strait rapprochement such as a transportation agreement that would allow regular 
weekend charter flights between Taiwan and China. ASEAN countries responded 
favorably, issuing a statement in 2008 that read, “We welcome the positive development 
in relations across the Taiwan Strait. We expressed our hope that cross-Strait relations 
would continue to improve.”181 The Singaporean government also expressed its positive 
sentiments for Ma’s conciliatory cross-Strait policies.182 Table 12 shows Singapore’s 
congratulatory statements and responses to the resumption of FTA negotiations with the 
new KMT-led government. 
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 Public Statements by Singapore on Ma Ying-jeou’s Presidency Table 12.  




electoral victory  
“Singapore last night congratulated 
Kuomintang candidate Ma Ying-jeou on 
his election as President and said it 
looked forward to better cross-Strait 
relations. ‘We welcome the successful 
conclusion of Taiwan’s presidential 
election on 22 March 2008 and 
congratulate Dr Ma Ying-jeou on his 
election,’ a Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
statement said in response to media 
queries. ‘As a long-standing friend of 
Taiwan, Singapore will continue to 
maintain good relations with Taiwan 












“FTAs with customs territories such as 
Taiwan are permissible under WTO 
rules. There were some preliminary 
discussions in 2001, but they ceased 
when the Chen Shui-bian administration 
tried to go beyond the WTO framework 
and politicised the issue. There have 
been no discussions since then. 
Furthermore, many developments under 
the Chen Shui-bian administration have 
since caused serious strains in cross-
strait relations. But Dr Ma Ying-jeou 
has recently proposed that Taiwan and 
China discuss an FTA. China has not 
rejected this. If Taiwan and the 
Mainland are able to make progress on 
an FTA and cross-strait relations 
improve, there will be many 
possibilities for enhanced economic 
cooperation between Singapore and 
Taiwan, provided that economic matters 
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“Singapore on Friday welcomed the 
successful conclusion of the first-ever 
cross-Strait talks held in Taiwan and the 








After a four-year hiatus, leadership visits resumed in 2009. That year, Lien Chan, 
senior KMT politician and former vice president of Taiwan, visited Singapore as a 
representative of Ma for the APEC summit in November. The meeting was significant for 
a number of reasons. Unlike the 2006 APEC meeting where China pressured Vietnam to 
withdraw the invitation to Taiwan, China did not pressure Singapore to limit Taiwanese 
participation for this event. Not only were Chinese leaders more comfortable interacting 
with the KMT, which had advocated reunification with China under conditions; China 
also saw this as an opportunity to show “goodwill” to the KMT government, which was 
working to ease cross-Strait tensions.186 Lien Chan had previously met CPC Secretary-
General Hu Jintao in 2005 in a high-profile visit to China, the first time a KMT leader 
had met his CPC counterpart since 1945—when Chiang Kai-shek had met Mao 
Zedong.187 At the event, Lien Chan met Hu Jintao at the sidelines of the APEC meeting, 
the first time that Taiwanese leaders had met Chinese leaders at an international forum. 
The atmosphere of the meeting was highly positive; acknowledging Lien Chan’s efforts 
in promoting cross-Strait relations, Hu Jintao proposed a “cross-Strait economic 
cooperation framework agreement” and said that “cross-Strait ties [were] facing an 
important and historic opportunity for development.”188 
The easing of cross-Strait tensions during Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency and the 
transition back to a KMT government saw Singapore’s leaders engaging Taiwan more, 
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both in private and in official capacities. In 2011, Lien Chan visited Singapore as the 
president’s representative—although it was not publicized and the purpose of the visit 
was not clear. In the same year, Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew also visited Taiwan on a 
“private visit” and met Lien Chan, Ma Ying-jeou, and Vincent Siew (then vice president) 
on separate occasions. Publicity for the visits were kept to a minimum. Singapore’s 
Straits Times wrote that Lee complimented Lien for the latter’s contribution to the 
improvement of cross-Strait ties.189 Lee also “affirmed Mr Siew’s contribution to 
Taiwan’s economic development and the improvement of cross-Strait ties over the past 
three years.”190 
There was a break in official visits from 2012 to 2014, likely due to Lee Kuan 
Yew’s failing health. The year 2015 saw two significant visits by Ma to the city-state, 
one for the funeral of Lee Kuan Yew in March and one for the historic meeting with 
Chinese President Xi Jinping in November. Ma’s visit to Singapore for Lee Kuan Yew’s 
funeral was in his capacity as a friend of the family, and he attended the private wake 
instead of the state funeral. Kept low key because of the significance of the trip—Ma was 
the first sitting president to visit Singapore in 26 years—the visit was publicized and 
picked up by Taiwanese news media only after Ma’s plane had departed Taiwan. 
According to several news articles, China did not sound a strong protest and only said 
that China believed Singapore would “act in accordance with the ‘one China’ 
principle.”191  Likely, China did not harshly criticize the visit for a combination of 
reasons: the low profile of the visit, the fact that it was a funeral event, and the relatively 
good relations between the Ma and Chinese leaders as compared to Chen Shui-bian’s 
term. 
Cross-Strait relations had progressed to a level that Singapore was able to sign a 
free trade agreement with Taiwan in 2013, after negotiations had been shelved in 2003. 
The agreement, ASTEP, was widely believed to have been made possible with the tacit 
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approval of Beijing. In 2010 when talks were beginning between Taiwan and Singapore, 
Beijing did not protest but said only it believed that Singapore would continue to “apply a 
One China policy and, based on that, handle economic and trade relations with Taiwan in 
an appropriate manner.” ASTEP is discussed further in a subsequent section. 
3. Relations between Singapore’s PAP Leadership and Taiwan’s KMT 
One of the key observations that emerged from studying Singapore–Taiwan 
relations in the last 16 years is that the upper echelon of Singapore’s People's Action 
Party (PAP) leadership has a good relationship with the KMT, and this relationship is one 
of the contributing factors to good Singapore–Taiwan relations. In 2005, when Singapore 
and Taiwan relations were at one of their lowest points following the name-calling 
incident triggered by Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Mark Chen, KMT Chairman Lien Chan 
visited Singapore and met with Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew.192 The visit was low-
profile, and Lien went to Singapore to give a speech at the Lee Kuan Yew School of 
Public Policy. Lien also met Lee Kuan Yew for dinner, and the two leaders arranged to 
discuss China–Taiwan relations.193 
In 2008, a few months after Ma Ying-jeou's inauguration as president, Singapore 
and Taiwan set up a parliamentary friendship association to promote bilateral 
relations.194 The association is made up of 57 Taiwanese legislators and chaired by a 
KMT legislator.195 Commenting on the association, then Taiwanese Deputy Foreign 
Minister Andrew Hsia said that the Taiwan had a “special friendship” with Singapore.196 
Singapore's Trade Representative in Taipei noted that Singapore had a long history of 
cooperating with Taiwan in the business, economic and cultural spheres and that many 
Singaporean companies were keen on business opportunities in Taiwan.197 
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The meeting between Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jinping that took place in Singapore 
on November 7, 2015, reflected not only the progress made in cross-Strait relations since 
Ma Ying-jeou took office but also the good relations between Singapore and Taiwan. 
According to the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore was asked by both 
China and Taiwan to provide the venue for the meeting.198 Besides pragmatic 
considerations, Singapore was trusted by the KMT government to arrange the Ma–Xi 
meeting because the same Singaporean government also facilitated the 1993 meeting 
between Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation chairman Koo Chen-Fu and China’s 
Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits chairman Wang Daohan.199 The 1993 
meeting was arranged by Ma Ying-jeou when he was deputy chairman of Taiwan’s 
Mainland Affairs Council and significant for establishing direct talks between Taiwan 
and China since 1949.200 
The Ma–Xi meeting also revealed the personal friendship between Ma Ying-jeou 
and Lee Hsien Loong. In a Facebook post by Lee, he addressed Ma as an “old friend,” 
and Ma called Lee the same in a comment made under the post.201 Ma also said in the 
comment that “Singapore [had] played a vital role in facilitating and witnessing peaceful 
development across the Taiwan Strait. Without you [Lee Hsien Loong] and your father 
[Lee Kuan Yew], none of this could have happened.”202 Earlier, on March 22, 2015, 
commenting on the passing of Lee Kuan Yew, Ma posted a picture of himself and Lee on 
his Facebook with a long caption that included a comment about how Taiwan–Singapore 
relations were based on the close friendship between Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee.203  
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It is evident that personal affinities played an important role in the establishment 
and maintenance of relations between Singapore and Taiwan. The “Lee Kuan Yew–
Chiang Ching-kuo connection” was broken when Chiang passed away and Lee Teng-hui, 
the new leader of the KMT-led government, did not share Chiang and Lee Kuan Yew’s 
vision of a unified One-China.204 Political relations between Singapore and Taiwan 
deteriorated under Lee, compared to their peak in the 1980s, but the deterioration was 
insignificant compared to the decline under the DPP government under Chen Shui-bian. 
Singapore was unable to establish rapport with the DPP government as it had with the 
KMT. To understand why the PAP was able to establish close ties with the KMT, the 
analysis of Professor Alan Chong is worth quoting at length: 
Neither personal ties, nor closed elite ties for that matter, could dictate 
foreign policy making behind closed doors in the manner of a Lee Kuan 
Yew–Chiang Ching-kuo connection. Since independence, closed foreign 
policy decision-making has been Singapore’s style and this has been 
reinforced by the ruling People’s Action Party’s hegemonic position 
within the Republic’s guided democracy. The challenges posed by Lee 
Teng-hui’s and Chen Shui-bian’s populist foreign policies to the 
Singaporean political elite exceeded the latter’s preferences.205 
B. SINGAPORE’S ECONOMIC TIES WITH TAIWAN 
In the 1990s, Taiwan’s economic relations with Southeast Asia flourished. 
Taiwan signed an investment protection agreement and double taxation avoidance 
agreement with Singapore in the 1990s.206 Over the next two decades, Singapore signed 
15 more economic agreements with Taiwan.207 Singapore was a major destination for 
Taiwan after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis; many Taiwanese investors pulled out of 
countries badly affected and wanted a more secure location for investment.208 With 
increased Taiwanese investment in Singapore, Singapore–Taiwan trade also increased. 
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Singapore’s trade with Taiwan was often much higher than Singapore–China trade in the 
1990s.209 
1. Rapidly Increasing Trade with China and Relative Decline in Trade 
with Taiwan from 2000 
Taiwan was an important trade partner to Singapore in the 1990s, but the booming 
Chinese economy and manufacturing industry expanded Singapore–China bilateral trade 
exponentially in the next decade. By 2000, China had overtaken Taiwan in trade volume 
to become Singapore’s fifth largest trading partner. Table 13 shows Singapore’s top ten 
trading partners from 1995 to 2015 in terms of total volume of merchandise goods traded. 
To provide a comparison over time, statistics for 1995 have been included. In 1995, 
Taiwan was Singapore’s eighth largest trading partner, and China was one place behind 
Taiwan. At the start of Chen Shui-bian’s term, China’s trade with Singapore had already 
surpassed the latter’s trade with Taiwan, becoming Singapore’s fifth largest trading 
partner. While Taiwan’s trade volume with Singapore hovered between seventh and tenth 
place, even after the 2013 bilateral free trade agreement, China’s trade volume with 
Singapore grew steadily over the years. In 2015, China became Singapore’s largest trade 
partner. Table 14 shows the percentage of Taiwan’s and China’s trade with Singapore 
over total trade. While both Taiwan’s and China’s contribution to Singapore’s total trade 
has increased since 2000, the percentage of China’s trade has increased significantly. As 
a percentage of Singapore’s GDP, the value of Taiwan’s trade has been on a downward 
trend since 2005. In contrast, the value of China’s trade grew from 13 percent in 2000 to 
30 percent in 2015. These statistics show that although Taiwan’s trade with Singapore 
remained more or less the same across years, the relative position of Taiwan’s trade vis-
à-vis China’s has declined.  
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 Singapore’s Top 10 Trading Partners 1995–2015 Table 13.  
(by Value of Goods Traded)210 
No. 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
1 Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia China 
2 USA USA USA China Malaysia 
3 Japan Japan China USA USA 
4 Hong Kong Hong Kong Indonesia Indonesia Indonesia 
5 Thailand China Japan Hong Kong Hong Kong 
6 ROK Thailand Hong Kong Japan Japan 
7 Germany Taiwan Thailand ROK ROK 
8 Taiwan ROK ROK Thailand Taiwan 
9 China Germany Taiwan India Thailand 
10 UK Philippines Germany Taiwan India 
 
 Percentage of Singapore’s Trade with Taiwan and China over Table 14.  
Total Trade and GDP 211 
Trade with n as a Percentage 
of total trade 
Trade with n as a Percentage 
of GDP 
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
n = Taiwan 
3.03 3.84 3.02 2.97 3.78 8.38 10.92 10.20 8.34 8.20 
n = China 




                                                 
210 Adapted from Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/FSCE000F/FSCE000F) and United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics 
(https://comtrade.un.org/). Data for 1995 are not available.  
211 Adapted from ASEAN Secretariat Macroeconomic Database and ASEAN statistics 
(https://data.aseanstats.org/), National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China 
(http://www.stats.gov.cn/), Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/FSCE000F/FSCE000F), United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics 
(https://comtrade.un.org/), World Bank (https://data.worldbank.org/) and World Trade Organization 
(http://stat.wto.org/StatisticalProgram/WSDBStatProgramSeries.aspx?Language=E). 
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Singapore is extremely trade dependent because it has virtually no natural 
resources. At 407.9 percent, Singapore has the highest trade-to-GDP ratio in the world.212 
As such, Singapore is extremely sensitive to the growth and decline of its major trading 
partners. Singapore is increasingly reliant on China as an engine of growth as China’s 
economy expands. Comparatively, Taiwan’s own economic growth is faltering. Although 
still an important economy in Asia, Taiwan’s growth rate has fallen by half every decade 
since the 1990s and is behind that of Singapore’s and China’s.213 Taiwan started its 
growth trajectory on the backs of electronics producers (original equipment 
manufacturers) and continues to export large numbers of electronic products to the world, 
especially Singapore, where it is the largest electronics exporter with a 30.2 percent 
market share. However, its manufacturing capacity has declined compared to China’s.214 
In the 2000s, China offered cheaper labor as an alternative to Taiwan’s, and in the 2010s, 
China moved up the production ladder to become a production hub to offer its own 
domestically produced electronic products.215  
2. Singapore’s Free Trade Agreement with Taiwan (ASTEP) 
Although Taiwan’s economic importance to Singapore has declined relative to 
China, Singapore still sees Taiwan as a major economic partner. In 2013, Singapore and 
Taiwan signed the ASTEP to boost exports for both economies. The tariff concessions 
will eventually benefit nearly all of Singapore’s exports to Taiwan once the agreement 
has been fully implemented. As a major exporter of electronics, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, machinery, and processed food products to Taiwan, Singapore-based 
businesses exporting such goods to Taiwan will benefit from the tariff removal. There 
have been quick but modest results from the implementation; according to Taiwan’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, two-way trade between Singapore and Taiwan increased by 
                                                 
212 “Singapore Economy,” Economy Watch, March 18, 2010, 
http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/singapore/?page=full. 
213 Jason Tan and Sue-Ann Chia, “The Big Read: A Tiger That Lost Its Roar, Taiwan Pays Price for 
Not Looking Ahead,” Today Singapore, February 27, 2016. 
214 John Liu, “Singapore Imports Most Electronics Products from Taiwan,” China Post, April 27, 
2016. 
215 “Tug of More: How Might Global Economic Changes Affect Singapore,” Committee on the Future 
Economy, Singapore Ministry of Communications and Information, July 20, 2016. 
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5 percent from May 2014 to January 2015 following the implementation of ASTEP.216 
According to Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs, ASTEP has also facilitated more 
cases of FDI by both Singapore and Taiwan.217 From May 2014 to February 2015, there 
were 108 Singapore-initiated cases of FDI, which accounted for $4.06 billion.218 The 
single largest FDI from Singapore was made by DBS Group Holdings Limited, which 
accounted for $1.31 billion.219 
The negotiation and conclusion of ASTEP provides an illuminating example of 
how political developments have affected economic relations between Singapore and 
Taiwan. As mentioned earlier, talks for a Singapore–Taiwan FTA started in 2002 but 
broke down in 2003 when Singapore refused to accommodate Taiwan’s demands for 
political recognition, presumably based on an acceptance of Taiwan’s separate status 
from China. Commenting on the breakdown in talks, then Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
said that Singapore would maintain economic links with Taiwan but Singapore would not 
officially recognize Taiwan as a “sovereign entity.”220 Lee also said, “Sometimes [the 
Taiwanese] government has to reconsider its position and decide let’s play economics as 
economics, and let’s play politics as politics,” drawing a clear line between the two 
realms.221 
Singapore eventually signed the FTA with the KMT government in 2013. The 
name of the FTA, while a mouthful, allowed Singapore to negotiate with Taiwan as what 
Lee Kuan Yew called an “economic entity.” Usage of the phrase “Separate Customs 
Territory” in the agreement’s name carried no political connotation, nor did it imply that 
Taiwan was a sovereign country. Circumstances in the early 2010s contributed to the 
successful conclusion of this agreement. First, Singapore has made it clear that an FTA 
with Taiwan rested on good cross-Strait relations and that Singapore’s relations with 
                                                 
216 “ASTEP Spurs Taiwan-Singapore Trade,” Taiwan Today, April 28, 2015. 




220 “S’pore-Taiwan FTA Scuttled by politics,” Business Times Singapore. 
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Taiwan should not develop faster than China–Taiwan ties.222 Ma Ying-jeou’s efforts to 
bridge the gaping divide between Taiwan and China on the status of Taiwan has mended 
cross-Strait relations and subsequently allowed the conclusion of the Economic Co-
operation Framework Agreement in 2010. Besides improved China–Taiwan relations, the 
lack of protests from China this time was also a contributing reason to the successful 
conclusion of ASTEP.223 Second, Singapore’s own relations with Taiwan were 
improving and the timing was ripe for the two to restart negotiations. 
3. Growing Chinese Investment in Singapore 
Although Singapore has moved beyond its post-colonial strategy of relying on 
FDI as an engine of growth to being a major investor in the region, FDI is still very much 
relevant to Singapore. Singapore was the top destination for Taiwanese investment in 
Southeast Asia from 1997–1998, but its investment has declined over time.224 Data 
compiled from Singapore’s Department of Statistics showed that neither Taiwan nor 
China were in the category of top ten investors in Singapore; Table 15 shows the top 
foreign investors in Singapore in 2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015, measured by the total level 
of direct investment in a year. From 2000 to 2015, China’s investment hovered around 
15th place. While there were more fluctuations for Taiwan, its total investment through 
2000–2015 was at 22nd place on average.  
  
                                                 
222 “Taiwan-Singapore FTA Hinges on Cross-Strait Ties,” China Post. 
223 Hsieh, “The Quest for Recognition,” 18. 
224 Buszynski, “Taiwan’s Economic Diplomacy towards ASEAN,” 9. 
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 Foreign Direct Investment in Singapore by Country/Region Table 15.  
(Stock at Year End), Annual225 
No. 2000 No. 2005 No. 2010 No. 2015 
1 United States 1 United 
 
1 United States 1 United States 
2 Japan 2 Japan 2 British Virgin 
 
2 Japan 
3 Netherlands 3 United States 3 Netherlands 3 British Virgin 
 















7 Cayman 7 Bermuda 7 Bermuda 7 Bermuda 
8 Hong Kong 8 Bahamas 8 Switzerland 8 Luxembourg 
9 Bermuda 9 Norway 9 India 9 Hong Kong 
10 Malaysia 10 Cayman 
 
10 Norway 10 Switzerland 
15 China 14 Taiwan 15 China 17 China 
17 Taiwan 28 China 22 Taiwan 21 Taiwan 
 
From the 2000s to 2010s, China’s investment in Singapore increased. Table 16 
shows the amount of Taiwanese and Chinese investment in Singapore in 2005, 2010, and 
2015. Chinese investment from 2005 to 2010 increased dramatically while Taiwanese 
investments increased at a more modest pace. Table 17 shows that for 2010, China’s 
investment in Singapore was the 15th largest while Taiwan’s investment was 17th. In 
2015, China’s investment was the fourth largest while Taiwan’s investment was the 10th 
largest. 
 Amount of Taiwanese and Chinese Investment in Singapore in Table 16.  
Millions, USD226 
Source Country 2005 2010 2015 
China  147 699.3 3812.7 
Taiwan  -348.8* 451.1 1123 
                                                 
225 Adapted from Singapore Department of Statistics, http://www.singstat.gov.sg/statistics/browse-by-
theme/investment-tables 
226 2005 data are from APEC (http://statistics.apec.org/index.php/bilateral_linkage/index); the rest are 
from ASEAN statistics (https://data.aseanstats.org/). Data for 1995 and 2000 are not available. *Indicates 
that at least one of the three components of FDI measured by APEC is negative and not offset by positive 
amounts of the remaining components. For more information, please refer to 
http://statistics.apec.org/index.php/apec_psu/glossary.    
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 Top 10 Foreign Investors in Singapore in Millions, USD (Flow)227 Table 17.  
No. Investor 2010 Investor 2015 
1 United States 6915.2 United States 18358.7 
2 Luxembourg 5732 Netherlands 6353.5 
3 United Kingdom 4990 Ireland 4986.2 
4 India 3642.5 China 3812.7 
5 Australia 3028.6 Japan 2357.3 
6 Japan 2816.9 United Kingdom 2054.9 
7 Malaysia 2808.7 Malaysia 1736.1 
8 Hong Kong 2228.4 Luxembourg 1543.8 
9 Thailand 1680.5 Australia 1258.8 
10 Germany 1642.4 Taiwan 1123 
15 China 699.3 Republic of Korea 1027.2 
17 Taiwan 451.1 Denmark 978.8 
 
Starting from Chen Shui-bian’s administration to the tail end of Ma Ying-jeou’s 
term, the steady growth of trade and investment between China and Singapore overtook 
that of Taiwan and Singapore. Although Singapore has a very open economy and trades 
extensively with many other countries, its economy has become increasingly dependent 
on the Chinese economy. However, despite the declining importance of Taiwan’s 
economy, Singapore–Taiwan economic relations have not been affected, as shown by the 
signing of the ASTEP in 2013 as well as other economic cooperation. In 2010, a 
delegation of 85 Taiwanese officials and businessmen visited Singapore to hold an 
investment seminar at the Shangri-La Hotel.228 The delegation was the largest ever for 
Taiwan. In 2016, the Singapore Exchange (SGX) and the Taiwan Stock Exchange 
(TWSE) established a strategic partnership whereby TWSE member brokers can directly 
trade SGX-listed securities.229 
                                                 
227 Adapted from ASEAN statistics (https://data.aseanstats.org/). Data for 1995, 2000, and 2005 are 
not available. 
228 “Largest-Ever Taiwanese Delegation Heads to Singapore,” Straits Times, November 20, 2010. 
229 “SGX-TWSE Tie-up to Let Taiwan Investors Access S'pore-Listed Stocks,” Business Times, 
January 27, 2016. 
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C. SINGAPORE’S MILITARY TIES WITH TAIWAN 
Singapore–Taiwan military relations first developed in the late 1970s when the 
fledging Singapore military was in need of external help. When Singapore was rejected 
by Britain, India, and Egypt, Singapore turned to Israel for help to develop its military in 
1965 after gaining independence.230 However, Singapore–Israel ties were geopolitically 
sensitive and could have worsened Singapore’s relations with its Muslim-majority 
neighbors.231 To diversify, Singapore thus sought Taiwanese offers to build up its 
military, first to train Singapore’s pilots and subsequently to build up the Singapore 
navy.232 After then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew signed the “Operation Starlight” 
agreement with Chiang Ching-kuo’s government, Singapore  began to send Singapore 
Armed Forces (SAF) troops to Taiwan for training.233 In the 1980s, SAF troops sent to 
Taiwan reached 15,000.234 With the availability of alternative overseas training bases, 
among other factors, SAF troops training in Taiwan decreased to approximately 7,000 in 
the late 2000s and further reduced to around 3,000 in the 2010s. This section examines 
the developments in Singapore–Taiwan military relations from 2000 to 2016. During this 
period, especially during the period when Chen Shui-bian took office, negative 
developments between Singapore and Taiwan affected military relations. Post-Chen, 
defense relations generally improved. Overall, Singapore has maintained its desire to act 
according to its interests and continue military training in Taiwan, but its approach 
toward military cooperation with Taiwan has undergone a subtle shift. While still warm, 
Singapore–Taiwan military relations in the 2010s were not as immune to Chinese 
intervention nor as good as they once were in the 1980s and 1990s.  
In the 2000s, poor cross-Strait relations and threats of Taiwan independence 
affected the maintenance of Singapore–Taiwan military relations despite Singapore’s 
commitment to continue military training in Taiwan. While China had tolerated 
                                                 
230 Yossi Melman, “Israel and Singapore: The Ties That Bind,” Jerusalem Post, May 1, 2016. 
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Singapore’s defense ties with Taiwan in the past, Beijing was less inclined to condone 
this relationship with the deteriorating cross-Strait relations under Chen Shui-bian.235 In 
the early 2000s, China offered to let SAF troops train on Hainan Island, but Singapore 
declined, citing opposition from the United States—as Singapore uses U.S. weapon 
systems—and the possibility of apprehension from its neighbors.236 Singapore also sees 
maintaining its training bases in Taiwan as critical to its national interests, and being a 
sovereign state, Singapore does not want to succumb to China’s pressure.237 The offer 
from China caused unease in Taiwan and led to a DPP lawmaker calling Singapore–
Taiwan military ties a threat and requesting a review of the training arrangement.238 The 
legislator of the ruling DPP government said that if Singapore did send its troops to 
China, Taiwan should cut defense ties as there would be a risk of Singaporean troops 
leaking secrets about Taiwan’s military to China.239 There was no evidence that 
Singapore responded to the legislator’s comments. In June 2001, Senior Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew said that Singapore’s position on military training in Taiwan remained 
unchanged, in response to a question about Singapore balancing its ties with the U.S. and 
China.240 Lee also made it clear that Singapore had an abiding interest in its access to 
training bases in Taiwan: “I discussed it once in 1990 when we established relations and I 
made our position clear: We are going to train in Taiwan. We are going to have the U.S. 
given access to our bases. That position is unchanged. That is in our interests.”241 
Although Singapore did persist in continuing Operation Starlight, a combination 
of factors likely drove Singapore to scale down its military engagement of Taiwan. 
Apparently at China’s insistence, Singapore in March 2005 abruptly cancelled a port call 
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by Taiwanese naval ships at China’s insistence, and the naval vessels were asked to 
anchor off the shores of Singapore.242 According to the South China Morning Post, 
Taiwanese Defense Minister Lee Jye said that Singapore was acting on Chinese protests, 
which came after the media found out about the visit and reported it.243 The cancellation 
angered Taiwanese from both the KMT and the DPP; KMT legislator Chen Chieh said 
the refusal to let the ships dock was a “humiliation to . . . national dignity and insulting to 
all the nationals of the Republic of China” while Taiwan Premier wanted to know the 
impact of the incident on Singapore–Taiwan relations.244 Taiwan Foreign Minister Mark 
Chen said that Singapore spoke “whatever the Chinese communists love[d] to hear” 
because Singapore placed more emphasis on its ties with China.245 In view of the friction 
between Singapore and Taiwan after the Singapore Foreign Minister’s speech at the 
United Nations General Assembly, the cancellation of the naval visit was also likely a 
sign of cooling defense relations between the two countries. 
In 2010, Taiwan Defense Minister Kao Hua-chu attended the Singapore Air Show 
and met Singapore Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean, who was also the defense 
minister.246 Kao’s visit was the first to Singapore since 1989, when former Defense 
Minister Cheng Wei-yuan accompanied former President Lee Teng-hui to the country.247 
During the visit, Kao reportedly met the Singaporean commander of the units that were 
sent to Taiwan as part of Operation Starlight.248 The Taiwanese news report that covered 
this story cited “unnamed high-ranking Taiwan officials” as categorizing Singapore–
Taiwan relations as “excellent,” but care had to be taken because of Singapore’s close 
relations with China.249 Kao’s visit was significant and likely made possible by both the 
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ease in cross-Strait tensions during that period as well as the mending of Singapore–
Taiwan relations. 
In 2012, Taiwanese media reported on Singapore’s unhappiness over the leak of 
Taiwan Defense Minister Kao Hua-chu’s visit to Singapore. Not publicized in 
Singapore—only one Singapore news outlet carried the news—the article labelled the 
visit as “rare” and quoted Taiwan’s official statement that Kao had visited Singapore to 
attend the air show. However, according to China Post, Taiwan’s local news outlet 
United Daily News had reported that Singapore was unhappy about media coverage, 
mostly from Taiwan, over the visit and had “delayed” visits of high ranking Taiwanese 
military officials to Singapore.250 China Post  reported that a Taiwan Defense Ministry 
spokesman dismissed the United Daily News report as false, but said that bilateral 
military cooperation programs were changing because of new requirements from both 
Singapore and Taiwan.251 Two years later in 2014, Defense Minister Yen Ming visited 
Singapore. Media reports assessed that the visit was to improve bilateral relations after 
the 2012 visit had damaged ties.252  
Singapore has also cooperated with China militarily in the last decade. Although 
Singapore declined the offer to use Hainan Island, SAF troops have been participating in 
joint exercises with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In November 2005, Singapore 
and China agreed to establish high-level annual defense policy dialogues as well as 
increase military visits and port calls.253 In 2009, the Singapore Armed Forces conducted 
a joint counter-terrorism training exercise in Guilin, China. This was the first time that 
the SAF had conducted a joint exercise with the PLA.254 The same exercise was repeated 
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in 2010 and 2014.255 The Taipei Times ran an article on the SAF’s military cooperation 
and provided a number of interesting facts about Singapore’s military cooperation with 
China. First, Taipei Times reported that the 70 SAF troops sent to China for the joint 
exercise were from “Project Starlight” (Operation Starlight).256 The report also quoted 
Taiwan’s Defense Ministry officials’ assessment of the nature of recent exercises 
between SAF and the PLA; the Singapore army had apparently increased dialogue with 
the PLA and conducted a series of joint exercises one after another in 2014.257 The 
Singapore Navy had also reached out to the PLA’s Navy, including sending ships for 
exercises in China, according to the same report.258 Taiwan’s own concerns about the 
PLA gaining “familiarity” through its interactions with SAF since the Taiwanese Navy 
operates similar frigates, for example, meant that Taiwan had to consider whether it 
would persist in its “current upgrade plans or seek alternatives.”259 The shift from 
resisting defense cooperation with China to engagement of the PLA cannot be seen as 
merely Singapore’s desire to seek deeper engagement with China. This thesis assesses 
that Singapore has weighed the benefits of cooperating with China against potential 
negative fallout with Taiwan and has decided to pursue engagement with China. 
Singapore may have developed a new outlook on the importance of engaging China 
militarily, or perhaps Singapore is now placing less emphasis on its military ties with 
Taiwan. 
D. SUMMARY 
Singapore’s relations with Taiwan preceded Singapore’s establishment of 
diplomatic relations with China, but since 1990, Singapore’s commitment to the One-
China policy has formed the basis for relations with Taiwan. Although Singapore–
                                                 
255 “SAF and PLA to Conduct Joint Counter-Terrorism Training Exercise” (official release), 
Singapore Ministry of Defense, November 10, 2010; and “SAF and PLA Conduct Bilateral Training 
Exercise” (official release), Singapore Ministry of Defense, November 2, 2014. 






Taiwan ties are some of the best bilateral relations in Asia, Singapore maintains clear 
lines between purely economic linkages, military interactions, and political relations. 
From 2000 to 2008, because the DPP government threatened to gain de jure 
independence for Taiwan, Singapore distanced itself from Taiwan so as not to violate its 
One-China commitment as well as out of fears that China may attack Taiwan. The DPP 
government tried to politicize all interactions with Singapore, one example being the 
negotiations for an FTA, and Singapore resisted. Political, economic, and military links 
thus suffered as a result of tensions between an independence-seeking DPP government 
and a Singapore that wants to maintain its relations with China. In addition, the 
Singapore–Taiwan relationship originated from close relations between the PAP and 
KMT leadership, in particular Lee Kuan Yew and Chiang Ching-kuo. Both parties 
believed in One-China and had a good understanding of each other’s views of the status 
of Taiwan. PAP leadership neither agreed with the DPP’s views on Taiwan nor built any 
rapport with the party.  
From 2008 to 2016, Singapore and Taiwan’s economic and political relations 
greatly improved. With better cross-Strait relations under Ma Ying-jeou’s conciliatory 
policies toward the mainland, Singapore could engage Taiwan more without strong 
protests from China. Singapore concluded the ASTEP with Taiwan in 2013 and 
facilitated the Ma–Xi meeting in Singapore in 2015. A convergence of views on the 
status of Taiwan and pragmatism from Ma Ying-jeou’s government allowed bilateral 
relations to develop without gridlocks on issues related to Taiwan’s sovereignty, such as 
using Taiwan’s official name in negotiations. Furthermore, familiarity between the PAP 
and KMT politicians was conducive to interactions between the two governments. In the 
realm of military relations, Singapore continues to maintain good relations with the 
Taiwanese military because of an abiding interest in securing land for training as well as 
the desire to pursue Singapore’s interest without interference from China. However, the 
number of SAF troops sent to Taiwan for training has been declining since the 2000s, and 
several incidents have caused problems for Singapore and Taiwan—including a widely 
reported fighter jet crash that killed three Singaporean soldiers and two Taiwanese 
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pilots.260 Singapore also started defense cooperation with China in the mid-2000s and 
held a joint exercise in 2009. The scale-down in troop deployment to Taiwan and the 
developing military relations with China signaled a subtle shift in Singapore’s approach 
to managing military relations with Taiwan. While still keen on continuing decades-old 
ties, Singapore is also expanding its military partners in the region at the risk of alienating 
Taiwan. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The comparative analysis of Vietnam’s and Singapore's relations with Taiwan 
during the administrations of Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian and President Ma Ying-
jeou reveals that a variety of factors were responsible for the changes in relations over the 
last 16 years. This chapter first summarizes the findings from the analysis of Vietnam–
Taiwan and Singapore–Taiwan relations from 2000 to 2016 to answer the research 
question. Next, it evaluates the three hypotheses laid out in Chapter I. Finally, it briefly 
discusses President Tsai Ing-wen's term since she was elected to office in May 2016 and 
its implications for Vietnam–Taiwan and Singapore–Taiwan relations in the future. 
A. FINDINGS 
Chapter II and III examined Vietnam–Taiwan and Singapore–Taiwan relations 
and found a number of reasons for changes in relations during each Taiwanese 
administration. While the hypotheses presented in Chapter I were generally true for 
Southeast Asia, the analysis yielded more factors that affected relations. Some of the 
factors featured more prominently than others. The factors are more or less unique to 
each country, so the explanations are organized by country in the following subsections.   
1. Vietnam 
The basis for relations between Vietnam and Taiwan is economic cooperation. 
High levels of Taiwanese investment in Vietnam and employment of Vietnamese 
workers by Taiwanese businesses have been motivating factors for Vietnam to maintain 
amicable relations with Taiwan. Economic relations between the two countries have 
improved from 2000 to 2016 as Taiwanese investments into Vietnam expanded. 
Although Vietnam's trade with Taiwan declined compared to its trade with China, 
Taiwan remained an important trade partner from 2000 to 2016.  
Political incidents took place from 2000 to 2008 between Vietnam and Taiwan 
because China had pressured Vietnam not to allow Taiwanese participation in 2006 for 
the APEC meeting as well as to limit the bilateral engagement of Taiwan. While the 
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political incidents resulted in verbal criticism from Taiwan, the strong economic ties 
between Vietnam and Taiwan mitigated a downturn in relations.  
From 2008 onward, although economic relations continued strongly and cross-
Strait rapprochement allowed for increased interactions between Vietnam and Taiwan 
without backlash from China, South China Sea disputes between the two prevented 
positive developments in bilateral relations. While Vietnam has been prepared to endure 
a certain amount of risk of being punished by China for engaging Taiwan, when it comes 
to territorial disputes in the South China Sea, Vietnam has not allowed its economic 
interests to stand in the way of asserting its own claims and preventing Taiwanese 
encroachment. 
2. Singapore 
Singapore's relations with Taiwan are underpinned by its conception of the 
international system and its own place within the system. Singapore first sought relations 
with Taiwan in the late 1960s because it needed a partner that would provide military 
assistance for the fledging Singapore military. Since then, Singapore has sought to 
maintain its military, political, and economic ties with Taiwan for its own national 
interests.  
The pro-Taiwan independence policies of the DPP government from 2000 to 2008 
drove Singapore to distance itself from Taiwan because Singapore committed to the One-
China policy and did not support Taiwanese independence. Leadership visits declined 
after 2004 as a result of Chinese criticism following Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien 
Loong's visit to Taiwan and as a result of tensions between Singapore and Taiwan after 
Foreign Minister George Yeo's United Nations speech. Singapore refused to further 
negotiate with Taiwan on the proposed free trade agreement because Taiwan wanted its 
name on the agreement to convey its political separateness from China. Singapore 
continued to send its soldiers to Taiwan for military training, but the number of troops 
was reduced by half in the late 2000s. In March 2005, Singapore abruptly cancelled a 
port call by Taiwanese naval ships and asked the ships to anchor off the shores of 
Singapore. 
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The administration of Ma Ying-jeou from 2008 to 2016 generally saw better 
Singapore–Taiwan relations in all dimensions. The KMT government's views on the 
status of Taiwan were consistent with the One China policy and dovetailed Singapore's 
own outlook on Taiwan. The Ma Ying-jeou administration was also pragmatic, bothered 
less with gaining political concessions from Singapore, and focused on substantial 
bilateral cooperation. Singapore was also on familiar terms with the KMT government, 
having built rapport with the party in the past. Thus, Ma Ying-jeou's term saw the 
conclusion of ASTEP, a high-quality FTA between Singapore and Taiwan, only the 
second agreement for Taiwan to sign with non-diplomatic partners, the first being with 
New Zealand. Taiwan's defense ministers have visited Singapore on a few occasions, and 
the visits have gone without incident save for one, which was leaked prematurely to the 
press. 
However, although relations between Singapore and Taiwan have improved since 
2008, this thesis also notes that Singapore's attitude toward military engagement with 
Taiwan has undergone a subtle shift. Singapore no longer takes an exclusive view to 
training with Taiwan while avoiding the PLA. Since 2005, Singapore has slowly stepped 
up its engagement of the PLA in both bilateral and multilateral exercises. It remains to be 
seen how this will affect Singapore–Taiwan military relations. 
B. ADDRESSING THE HYPOTHESES AND THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
(1) Cross-Strait Relations Was One of the Main Factors that Contributed to 
the Changes in Taiwan–Southeast Asia Relations 
The state of cross-Strait relations affected the way Vietnam and Singapore 
interacted with Taiwan from 2000 to 2016, since all Southeast Asian countries have 
diplomatic relations with China. However, there were varying degrees of influence of 
cross-Strait relations on bilateral relations for Vietnam and Singapore. Tense cross-Strait 
relations did not directly influence Vietnam or Singapore to pull back from their 
engagement of Taiwan, when relations between Taiwan and China were at their worst 
from 2000 to 2008. It was only when China exerted pressure on the countries that 
Vietnam and Singapore took action to placate China. Easing of cross-Strait tensions and 
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improving Taiwan-China relations did not automatically push Vietnam or Singapore to 
seek closer cooperation with Taiwan. 
Vietnam was pressed by China to limit its engagement of Taiwan during Chen 
Shui-bian's presidency, such as in 2006 when China wanted Vietnam to withdraw its 
APEC invitation to Taiwan. While on some occasions Vietnam tried to accommodate 
China, Vietnam persisted in inviting Taiwan to APEC in 2006. Vietnam's own economic 
interests compelled it to achieve a balanced relationship with both China and Taiwan. 
During the same period, Singapore, whose own security interests drove it to establish and 
maintain political and military relations with Taiwan, tried to maintain a consistent 
approach toward its bilateral relations with Taiwan. The tense cross-Strait relations 
compelled Singapore to publicly condemn Taiwan's provocative actions, but it was 
Singapore's disagreement with the DPP's pro-independence stance that was most 
responsible for the decline in relations during Chen's administration. Singapore 
eventually distanced itself from Taiwan when it became clear that Chen Shui-bian was 
going down the path of obtaining de jure independence for Taiwan. 
When cross-Strait relations eased under Ma Ying-jeou's conciliatory policies 
toward China, Vietnam did not initiate more political interaction with Taiwan, as evident 
from the dearth of high-level visits between Vietnam and Taiwan from 2007 to 2013. 
This was likely due to the rise in tensions over competing claims to South China Sea 
features. Like China and other Southeast Asian countries, both Vietnam and Taiwan took 
unilateral actions to assert their own claims, which resulted in strained political relations. 
Economic relations continued unabated, however, and in 2010, Taiwan even considered 
an FTA with Vietnam. In the more conducive political climate from 2008 to 2016, 
Singapore reconnected with the new Taiwanese government. This was largely because 
both the Singapore and Taiwan governments were willing to put aside political issues to 
work on pragmatic cooperation. Overall, Singapore's relations with the KMT-led 
government greatly improved from 2008 to 2016.  
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(2) The Change in Importance of Taiwan’s Economy vis-à-vis China’s Was 
One of the Main Factors that Contributed to the Changes in Taiwan–
Southeast Asia Relations 
Taiwan's economy has not grown very much since the 1990s, and this has resulted 
in a general decline in its economic links with Southeast Asia, especially against the 
spectacular growth of the Chinese economy. However, Taiwan remains an important 
economic partner to both Vietnam and Singapore. For both of these countries, the general 
decline of Taiwan's economy did not have a perceptible effect on bilateral relations.  
From 2000 to 2016, Vietnam proactively sought economic cooperation with 
Taiwan to boost its own economic development. Vietnam's invitation to Taiwan for the 
APEC summit reflected Vietnam's view of Taiwan as an important member of APEC. 
Vietnam has also consistently invited Taiwanese businesses to the country to promote 
FDI. The May 2014 protests in Vietnam that damaged Taiwanese factories were quickly 
followed by official apologies from the Vietnamese government and assurances that 
Vietnam would look into compensating the affected businesses. In 2016, Taiwan 
remained one of the top investors in Vietnam with 2,509 projects worth over $31 billion. 
Being extremely trade dependent, Singapore seeks better trade relations with all 
trade partners, including Taiwan, as the latter is one of Singapore's largest trading 
partners. Similar to Vietnam's experience, even though Taiwan’s economic power has 
declined relative to China, Singapore still sees a high value in cooperating with Taiwan. 
The most apparent manifestation of this is the signing of the ASTEP in 2013 to boost 
exports and FDI for both countries.  
(3) The Way that Southeast Asia Countries Perceived China Was One of the 
Main Factors that Contributed to the Changes in Taiwan–Southeast Asia 
Relations 
This hypothesis originated from two general observations about Southeast Asian 
concerns over the rise of China and its behavior in the South China Sea. First, China's 
development as an economic and military power has been met with a degree of 
trepidation because Southeast Asian countries have not known how a powerful China will 
behave. Second, China's assertiveness in the South China Sea has threatened the national 
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interests of claimant countries. Southeast Asian countries have thus viewed China as 
potentially threatening.  
For Vietnam, a country that has a long history with China as well as disputes with 
China over South China Sea features, its perception of China is rooted in real anxiety and 
uncertainty. Because the South China Sea is the most intense conflict between Vietnam 
and China, it was used as part of the case study to examine Vietnam's perception of China 
from 2000 to 2016. Chapter II found that Vietnam increasingly sees China as threatening, 
especially after 2014 when a major clash over a Chinese-registered deep-water drilling 
rig in Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone took place. To deal with China, Vietnam has 
been pursuing cooperation with regional powers such as the United States and Japan as 
well as with ASEAN. However, this balancing strategy does not include closer 
cooperation with Taiwan because Taiwan has also been asserting its claims to the South 
China Sea features.  
Singapore sees the rise of China as both beneficial as well as potentially 
threatening. The lack of bilateral disputes between the two countries has meant that 
Singapore has been able to cultivate good relations with China since the establishment of 
diplomatic ties in 1990 while also trying to promote a balance of power in the region. Not 
only did Singapore engage the United States actively; Singapore also continues to 
maintain its overseas military training arrangement with Taiwan primarily to compensate 
for its own scarcity of land as well as exercises its rights to pursue national interests 
without interference from China. Singapore's new strategic calculations in the post-Cold 
War period has been responsible for driving Singapore–Taiwan relations, which started 
as a partnership between two anti-communist countries. This outlook has not changed 
very much in the last 16 years, and there have been no major changes to Singapore's 
foreign policy with regard to Taiwan.  
However, this thesis also notes that since 2016, Singapore has started to see 
China's pursuit of sovereignty rights in the South China Sea as aggressive and 
threatening. Singapore has spoken out on the South China Sea disputes and urged 
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countries to respect international law.261 While not pointing fingers, Singapore is 
definitely entreating China to stop behaving unilaterally and aggressively in the South 
China Sea and to use international mechanisms to resolve the disputes.  
C. TSAI ING-WEN'S PRESIDENCY 
New Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen came to office following the January 
elections and is the second DPP politician to hold this position. Two of her policies are of 
major interest and importance to Southeast Asia. The first is Tsai's take on China–Taiwan 
relations, and the second is her “New Go South Policy,” which aims to strengthen 
relations with Southeast Asia and South Asia.262 
Tsai Ing-wen has not accepted the 1992 Consensus, which includes the One-
China principle, since she took office but has said that she wants to preserve the status 
quo of cross-Strait relations—meaning she will neither undo the cross-Strait 
breakthroughs achieved during Ma Ying-jeou's term nor attempt to realize Taiwan's 
independence.263 Tsai's refusal to accept the 1992 Consensus has resulted in a stalemate 
between Taiwan and China, with the latter refusing to hold talks with Taiwan.264 Aware 
of the tensions that arose from the last DPP government, Southeast Asian countries are 
carefully observing developments across the Taiwan Strait. There have already been 
problems from Tsai's refusal to accept the 1992 Consensus, either because China has 
applied pressure on Southeast Asian countries to steer clear of engaging the DPP 
government or because the countries have imposed some distance themselves.  
In January 2017, Taiwan protested Vietnam's deportation of four Taiwanese 
criminal suspects to China instead of Taiwan.265 The four suspects were handed over to 
China in part because China wanted to try the suspects because of the severity of their 
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alleged crimes against Chinese citizens.266 The Taiwan Foreign Ministry said that 
Vietnam has “forcibly sent the suspects to the Chinese mainland under intense pressure 
[from China]” and has gone against the principle of national governments having 
jurisdiction over their overseas citizens.267  
In November 2016, nine of the Singapore Armed Forces’ Terrex infantry carrier 
vehicles were detained by Hong Kong customs while en route to Singapore from 
Taiwan.268 Although the official reason given by the Hong Kong authorities was a 
licensing breach by shipping company APL, China took the opportunity to remind 
Singapore to “keep its promise to the One China principle.”269 In response to Singapore's 
assertion that the vehicles were protected by diplomatic immunity after the detainment 
stretched to two months, China again told Singapore to “earnestly respect the One China 
policy” and “be cautious with their words and actions.”270 The long detainment led to 
observers saying that China was “punishing” Singapore for its continued military training 
in Taiwan.271 It is likely that Hong Kong was following Beijing's orders by detaining the 
Terrex vehicles for an extended period, and this incident, as well as the aforementioned 
deportation incident, is a reflection of China's strong-arm tactics when it comes to the 
Taiwan issue. 
Tsai Ing-wen was not reinventing the wheel when she announced the launch of 
the New Go South Policy since former Taiwanese Presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen 
Shui-bian had previously embarked on programs to build more and deeper economic 
linkages with Southeast Asia, with varying degrees of success. While Southeast Asian 
countries, especially Vietnam, may have received news of this policy keenly because of 
the economic benefits, these countries are also aware that this policy has “always been 
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associated as a policy tool to counterbalance China-Taiwan economic integration, along 
with other strategic benefits, such as enlarging Taiwan's ‘international space’ and 
increasing Taiwan's relevance and leverage in Southeast Asia.”272 Although it is too early 
to tell, memories of Chen Shui-bian's attempts to politicize all aspects of Southeast Asian 
relations for the cause of Taiwanese independence may hinder cooperation between 
Southeast Asia and Taiwan. In May 2017, Tsai Ing-wen held a press conference to 
publicize the government's interest in Southeast Asia and South Asia.273 Tsai also singled 
out Singapore as a possible partner to help Taiwan realize this policy: “If Singapore is 
prepared to be in the position to help, we will be very happy to build a platform of some 
sort so we can make use of the Singapore experience in developing relationships with 
Southeast Asia.”274 Singapore did not respond publicly to Tsai's proposal. Also 
noteworthy is the lack of Singaporean leadership visits to Taiwan since Tsai's 
inauguration, which suggests that Singapore is putting some distance between itself and 
Taiwan to avoid a repeat of the 2004 incident.  
The refusal of the DPP government to accept the 1992 Consensus as well as the 
geopolitical implications of the New Go South Policy cast an air of uncertainty over the 
development of Southeast Asia's relations with Taiwan. Economic cooperation may 
continue and even progress between Vietnam and Taiwan, but political relations may 
stagnate given China's pressuring tactics. Singapore is exhibiting a more cautious 
approach to managing its relations with Taiwan since its bitter experience dealing with 
the last DPP government, and it seems unlikely that ties will progress during Tsai's 
presidency.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the two sets of bilateral relations in this thesis found that there are 
a number of factors that affect ties between them and Taiwan. Both Vietnam and 
Singapore see their relations with Taiwan through a multitude of lenses covering 
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economic, political, and military dimensions. At the same time, national interests and 
strategic considerations have led to different approaches to managing the bilateral 
relations at different points in time.  
While the general atmosphere across the Taiwan Strait matters, Vietnam and 
Singapore have both strived to act according to their national interests. Vietnam 
emphasizes economic cooperation with Taiwan because it is still making the transition 
from a developing economy to a developed one. Of equal or higher priority is Vietnam's 
sovereignty rights in the South China Sea, and Vietnam is prepared to fight tooth and nail 
to defend its claims. Although Vietnam knows that Taiwan is a rival to China, Vietnam 
has so far abided by the One-China principle. Taiwan's own South China Sea claims are a 
hindrance to progress in Vietnam–Taiwan relations. Singapore's geopolitical 
disadvantages have compelled it to seek close cooperation with Taiwan politically, 
economically, and militarily. However, the strong and cordial relations that both 
countries have enjoyed for decades have been challenged by the Taiwanese independence 
cause and new Chinese leaders who are less tolerant of Singapore's friendship with 
Taiwan.  
While Tsai Ing-wen has tried to avoid escalating cross-Strait tensions, she has 
also made it clear that she would not give in to China. The development of Vietnam–
Taiwan and Singapore–Taiwan relations is uncertain and is contingent on the ability of 
Tsai to achieve breakthroughs in the cross-Strait stalemate, grow Taiwan's economy, as 
well as realize the New Go South Policy in a manner that does not politicize economic 
cooperation. China's tolerance for Vietnam’s and Singapore's engagement of Taiwan will 
be a main determinant in the extent of these ties into the future. Vietnam’s and 
Singapore's own national interests are the other major determinants in the development of 
relations with Taiwan. The analysis of two countries was intended to provide a more 
nuanced study of Southeast Asia's relations of Taiwan, and the author hopes that the 
study reflects a microcosm of the larger regional trend. This thesis did not study domestic 
politics in Vietnam and Singapore and the effects on the countries' international relations. 
During the period of the study, both Vietnam and Singapore experienced stable political 
regimes under the Vietnam Communist Party and the People's Action Party, which have 
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contributed to long-term strategic considerations and foreign policy approaches. 
However, this thesis acknowledges that changes in the domestic political situation in the 
two countries, as in any other Southeast Asian country, can significantly affect their 
attitude toward engaging Taiwan, whether for better or for worse. 
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APPENDIX A.  VIETNAM’S PUBLIC AFFIRMATION OF THE 
ONE-CHINA POLICY AND OPPOSITION TO TAIWANESE 
INDEPENDENCE 2000–2008 
Date Subject Verbatim Extract Source 
December 
2001 
Vietnam and China issued a 
joint communique when 
Vietnamese Communist 
Party Secretary General 
Nong Duc Manh visited 
China 
“Vietnam reiterated that 
Vietnam recognizes the 
Government of the People’s 
Republic of China as the sole 
rightful Government for 
China, and that Taiwan is an 
inseparable territory of China. 
Vietnam only conducts non-
official trade with Taiwan and 
does not develop official 









Vietnam and China issue 
joint communique after 
Chinese President Hu 
Jintao visited Vietnam and 
met Community Party of 
Vietnam General Secretary 
Nong Duc Manh, President 
Tran Duc Luong, Prime 
Minister Phan Van Khai 
and Chairman of the 
National Assembly Nguyen 
Van An 
“Vietnam affirmed that it 
would ‘pursue a policy of one 
China, support China's great 
unification cause, and 
resolutely oppose actions to 
split “independent Taiwan” in 
any form, fully understand 
and back the National 
People's Congress of China's 
ratification of the "Anti-
Secession Law", welcome the 
detente trend in the relations 
of the mainland China and 
Taiwan in recent years. 
Vietnam does not develop any 
official relationship with 
Taiwan. The Chinese side 
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Date Subject Verbatim Extract Source 
March 2006 
Vietnam reaffirms its 
stance on “One-China” 
policy 
“Vietnam persists in its one-
China stance and resolutely 
opposes moves towards an 
"independent Taiwan" in any 
form, reaffirmed a spokesman 
on 3 March. Vietnamese 
Foreign Ministry's 
Spokesman Le Dung 
reiterated Vietnam's policy 
when answering 
correspondents' questions 
about Taiwanese Chen Shui-
bian's decision on 27 
February ‘to cease the 
function of the National 
Unification Council and the 
application of the National 







Visiting Vietnamese State 
President Nguyen Minh 
Triet met with Chinese 
President 
Hu Jintao and Chairmen of 
the Standing Committee of 
the National People’s 
Congress Wu Bangguo. 
“China's state news agency 
Xinhua quoted Triet as saying 
that “ties with Beijing was a 
‘priority’, and he opposed 
Taiwan 
independence separatist 






Vietnam reaffirms its 
stance on “One-China” 
policy 
“The Vietnamese 
Government affirmed its firm 
stance on the 'one-China' 
policy as Foreign Ministry 
spokesman Le Dung 
commented on Taiwan's push 
for a referendum on the 
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Date Subject Verbatim Extract Source 
February 
2008 
Vietnam reaffirms its 
stance on “One China” 
policy 
“Vietnam consistently 
pursues an ‘one-China’ policy 
and opposes all attempts at an 
independent Taiwan in any 
form, Foreign 
Ministry spokesman Le Dung 







Vietnam reaffirms its 
stance on “One China” 
policy 
“Foreign Ministry 
spokesperson Le Dung 
reaffirmed the nation’s one-
China policy which puts 
Taiwan as an integral part of 
the world’s most populated 
country. Questioned about 
Viet Nam’s reaction to the 
March 22 election in Taiwan 
where Ma Ying-jeou was 
elected as its head, the 
spokesman said, ‘Viet Nam 
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APPENDIX B.  SINGAPORE’S PUBLIC AFFIRMATION OF THE 
ONE-CHINA POLICY AND OPPOSITION TO TAIWANESE 
INDEPENDENCE 2000–2008 
Date Subject Verbatim Extract Source 
March 
2000 
On the DPP winning 
the Presidential 
Election in 2000, the 
first by the 
opposition 
“Singapore last night congratulated 
Mr Chen Shui-bian for winning the 
presidential election, which it said 
reflected the choice of the Taiwanese 
people. Asked about its impact on 
Singapore's one-China policy, the 
spokesman said the policy had been 
consistent and it remained unchanged. 
‘Singapore recognises that there is 
only one China and that Taiwan is part 
of China. The Government of the 
Republic of Singapore recognises the 








On former Prime 
Minister Goh Chok 
Tong visiting China 
after the DPP won 
the Presidential 
Election in 2000. 
“Mr Goh, on his part, has in the past 
two weeks been expressing concern 
that cross-Strait tension could 
destabilise Asia, and mar its hopes of 
economic recovery. He said yesterday: 
"I was concerned that although this is 
an internal matter, how they handle 
this issue will affect the stability and 
security of Asia. We are in Asia and 
therefore, as the neighbours of China, 
are concerned." He said that 
Singapore's position was clear: it 
recognised one China and that Taiwan 







On Singapore and 
Taiwan relations 
after Chen’s victory 
and possibility of a 
trade plan 
“Singapore will respond positively to 
Taiwan's proposal for a free trade 
area, cooperation in the financial 
sector and 
alliances in telecommunications, IT 
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Date Subject Verbatim Extract Source 
Kuan Yew) said that relations between 
the new government in Taiwan and 
Singapore would be better than they 
had been while ex-President Lee 
Teng-hui was in charge. ‘In the last 
six years, economic cooperation 
between Taiwan and Singapore has 
been at a low key, he noted.’”284 
June 2001 On Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) 
training in Taiwan 
“Singapore remains unchanged in its 
position to continue military training 
in Taiwan and to allow US military 
access to bases in Singapore, said 
Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew. 
"We have our interests, China has its 
interests, America has its interests," he 
said. The Senior Minister made the 
comments when he was asked how the 
Republic would balance its ties with 
the US and China, in particular, 
whether US military access to 
Singapore was a concern given the 







On negotiations for 
Singapore-Taiwan 
FTA 
“TAIWAN'S Board of Foreign Trade 
(BOFT) held talks recently with its 
Singapore counterpart with a view 
towards establishing a Free Trade 
Agreement. Although the talks are 
preliminary, BOFT director Wayne 
Wu told BT he hopes significant 
progress will be made by 
the end of this year. 'Singapore has 
expressed significant interest in 
moving forward with the agreement,' 
Mr Wu said, adding that 'we still 
need to conduct a feasibility study to 
understand what aspects Taiwan needs 
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Date Subject Verbatim Extract Source 
October 
2003 
On negotiations for 
Singapore-Taiwan 
FTA 
“Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
revealed last night that Singapore 
welcomed talks on a free trade 
agreement with Taiwan as a major 
economic player when it was 
approached by the latter. But the talks 
got bogged down when Taiwan 
wanted to negotiate as a political 
entity. Mr Lee said Singapore 
continues to have economic ties with 
Taiwan, but there will be no official 
recognition of 





June 2004 Deteriorating China-
Taiwan relations 
“Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok 
Tong has issued a warning against 
Taiwan independence, saying it would 
result in a war and a permanent rise in 










Lee Hsien Loong 
visited Taiwan 
“A Singaporean government statement 
said Mr Lee's ‘private visit to Taiwan 
reflects Singapore's concern over the 
current tense cross-Strait situation’. 
Mr Lee would share his views on the 
issue in private meetings with 
‘friends’ on the 









Minister Lee Hsien 
Loong responds to 
China’s criticism of 
his visit to Taiwan 
“Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong 
yesterday reiterated Singapore's 
commitment to the One China policy 
and said that Singapore could not 
support Taiwan if the latter provoked 
a cross-Strait conflict. 'If a war breaks 
out across the straits, we will be 
forced to choose between the two 
sides. As a friend of both sides, any 
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Date Subject Verbatim Extract Source 
conflict is provoked by Taiwan, then 
Singapore cannot support Taiwan,' he 







“Ties between Singapore and Taiwan 
soured recently after Mr Chen on 
Monday called the Republic a country 
no bigger than 'a piece of dried nasal 
mucus' and used a Hokkien expletive 
to insult Singapore for currying favor 
with China. His remarks came after a 
speech by Singapore's Foreign 
Minister George Yeo at the United 
Nations General Assembly 
last week, saying that activities by 
some pro-independence groups in 
Taiwan could spark a war with China 











“Singapore yesterday said Taiwan 
President Chen Shui-bian's recent 
remarks that Taiwan 'must be 
independent' were unhelpful and could 
increase the risk of instability in cross-
Strait relations. 
Yesterday, the MFA reiterated that 
Singapore has a clear 'one China' 
policy and is opposed to Taiwan 
independence 
and any unilateral moves to change 







On Taiwan’s attempt 




“Singapore on Monday reiterated that 
it opposes Taiwan authority's attempt 
to put Taiwan's UN membership bid to 
a referendum, saying the move is 
provocative and irresponsible. 
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Date Subject Verbatim Extract Source 
statement Monday night that its "One 
China" policy is clear and consistent, 
and it remains firmly opposed to any 
unilateral move to alter the status of 
Taiwan.”293 
February 
2008 Singapore Air Show 
“Taiwan's state-run aerospace 
company has been forbidden from 
displaying the name "Taiwan" on its 
booth or showing the national emblem 
on its exhibits at an aviation show 
being held in Singapore, a company 
official said Tuesday. The organizers 
of Singapore Airshow 2008 also 
banned a DVD recording of the March 
2007 christening ceremony for the 
company's upgraded indigenous 
defence fighters presided over by 
President Chen Shui-bian, said 
Aerospace Industrial Development 
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